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I. INTRODUCTION
The dogma of judicial reformers in New York for more than one
hundred years has been not to compromise or accept what they
deem to be half-way measures on the issue of judicial reform.' Pers-
istence, belief in the correctness of their cause, and faith in ultimate
victory have been the talisman of the judicial reform movement. If
they were beginning to waiver in recent years, the successful passage
of the 1977 constitutional amendment adopting merit selection for
the New York Court of Appeals2 and the gains of judicial reformers
* A.B., Yale University, 1962; LL.B., Harvard University, 1965. Member of the New
York Bar. The author wishes to thank Ms. JoAnn Cory for her invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this article.
I The historical and political background of judicial selection reform proposals in New
York is detailed in Kaminsky, Judicial Selection: Alternatives to the Status Quo in the
Selection of State Court Judges, 48 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 496, 499-508 (1974). See generally
Niles, The Popular Election of Judges in Historical Perspective, 21 REc. OF N.Y.C.B.A. 523
(1966). Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1104
(1976); Note, Judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study with Proposals for Reform, 4
HorSTRA L. REv. 267, 276-80 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Selection].
2 See, e.g., Court-Reform Amendments Pass Final Test, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 29, 1978, at 1,
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elsewhereO have breathed new verve into the judicial reform move-
ment. This is a welcome development because a pressing need still
exists for improvement in the selection of judges at the trial level.
While an ambitious program for broadening reform to all state
courts was undertaken in 1978, and mobilization for more vigorous
efforts in 1979 and beyond is already underway,4 there appears to
be a logjam between those who favor an across-the-board switch to
a merit system of appointment and those who favor retention of our
current elective method of selecting trial judges.5 The purpose of
this article is to briefly capsulize this dispute and review several
possible compromise reforms which appear to be available to break
the stalemate in New York.'
col. 3; Strong Vote in City Secures Victory for 3 Court Proposals, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 1977, at
1, col. 2.
1 See Schulert & Hoelzel, Court Reform, the Unheralded of the 1976 Elections, 60
JUDICATURE 281 (1977).
'See Carey, Court Reform: Looking Back with Pride at Last Year's Success .
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1978, at 1, col. 5, at 23, col. 6; Freedman, Continued Court Reform Urged
by Carey, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 4, 1979, at 1, col. 2; Goldstein, Carey Seeks Power to Merge 11
Courts and Select Judges, N.Y. Times, April 3, 1979, at A-1, col.3; Hochberger, Drive Started
for Expanding Merit Selection to All Courts, N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1978, at 1, col. 3; Schair,
Court Reform: Looking Ahead at Plans, Priorities for This Year, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1978, at
23, col. 6; Carey, Cooke Open Campaign For Court Reform Measures, N.Y.L.J., April 2,1979,
at 1, col. 2. See also Fox, Court Reform: Final Approval Sought in Albany, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
17, 1977. at 1, col. 2, at 5, cols. 2-4.
See, e.g., Gordon, Judicial Reform: A Legislative Viewpoint, 48 N.Y. St. B.J. 284,
286 (1976); Hochberger, No Chance Seen Now to Extend Merit Selection of Judges,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
a This article will discuss neither the pros and cons of the merit plan nor engage in the
underlying appointment versus election debate; both of these subjects have been fully ex-
plored in prior articles by this author and more eloquent and erudite scholars and spokesmen.
For the arguments in favor of appointment by merit selection, see Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CrIT OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMrriEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONvENTION ON THE
SELECTION OF JUDGES (1967); Garwood, Democracy and the Popular Election of Judges: An
Argument, 16 Sw. L.J. 216 (1962); Hall, Merit Selection and Merit Election of Judges, 4 GA.
ST. B.J. 169 (1967); Hays, Selection of Judges in Oklahoma, 2 TULSA L. REV. 127 (1965);
Nelson, Variations on a Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 4 (1962);
Niles, The Changing Politics of Judicial Selection: A Merit Plan for New York, 22 REc. OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 242 (1967); O'Connell & Means, Should Judges be Selected by the Merit Plan?
Yes, . . . 40 FLA. B.J. 1146 (1966); Parsons, The Selection and Tenure of Florida Supreme
Court Judges, 9 MIAMI L.Q. 271 (1955); Sears, Judicial Selection-The Horse Before the Cart,
48 ILL. B.J. 272 (1959); Segal, Nonpartisan Selection of Judges: Pennsylvania's Experiment,
50 A.B.A.J. 830 (1964); Spaeth, Reflections on a Judicial Campaign, 60 JUDICATURE 10 (1976);
SPECIAL COMMSSION ON REVISION OF Tm N.Y. ST. CONsT., Judiciary-Selection, Tenure and
Removal, 24 N.Y. COUNTY LAW. B. BULL. 214 (1967); Workbook Prepared for The Citizens'
Committee on the Merit Plan for Judicial Selection, 43 CAL. ST. B.J. 153 (1968); Note,
Judicial Selection and Tenure in Indiana: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Reform, 39 hin.
L.J. 364 (1964); Note, Judicial Selection in North Dakota-Is Constitutional Revision
Necessary?, 48 N.D. L. REV. 327 (1972); Comment, Judicial Selection and Tenure-A Merit
Selection Plan for Arizona?, 9 Am. L. REv. 297 (1967); N.Y. Times, July 27, 1973, at 30, col.
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IH. THE NEED FOR COMPROMISE
Surprisingly, there is virtual agreement among interested par-
ties that we need or at least will benefit from reform in our method
of selecting judges.7 The real dispute is over the form and nature
that reform should take. The need for compromise results from the
conclusion of many that there will be no quick resolution of the
appointment versus election debate.
For all our certainty about what is the best way to select judges,
the simple fact is that both sides in the appointment versus election
controversy proceed, to a great extent, on the basis of generaliza-
tions that do not necessarily comport with the facts.8 For example,
regardless of the method provided in the state constitution for the
selection of judges, the majority in New York and elsewhere are
2; id., July 20, 1972, at 32, col. 2 (editorial); id., Mar. 6, 1970, at 38, col. 2 (editorial). For
the arguments in favor of election, see E. COSTIKYAN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 174-210 (1966);
Golomb, Selection of the Judiciary: For Election, 24 N.Y. CouNTY LAW. B. BULL. 215 (1967);
Harding, The Case for Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A.J. 1162 (1969); Keefe, Judges
and Politics: The Pennsylvania Plan of Judge Selection, 20 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 621 (1959); Roth,
Why lam Against the California Merit Plan, The Missouri Plan-Or Any Reasonable Facsim-
ile Thereof, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 346 (1967); Spence, Should Judges Be Selected by Merit Plan?,
No. . ., 40 FLA. B.J. 1147 (1966); Desmond, 'Merit Selection' Isn't Easy Answer to Choose
Judges, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1975, at 25, col. 4; Desmond, 6 Good Judges-An Argument in
Support of Elective Process, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1974, at 25, col. 1. Lewis, A Dubious Reform,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, at A-21, col. 1.
For a summary of the arguments pro and con, see Kaminsky, note 1 supra, at 508-15;
Seiler, Judicial Selection in New Jersey, 5 S'roN HALL L. REv. 721 (1974); Note, Judicial
Selection in New York: A Need For Change, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 605 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as A Need for Change]; Shestakofsky & O'Connor, Should State's Top Judges Be
Appointed?, Newsday, Nov. 3, 1977, at 94; Law: Here Come the Judges, Time, Dec. 11, 1978,
at 67, cols. 1-3.
See, e.g., Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906); Van Osdol, Politics and Judicial Selection, 28 ALA. LAW.
167, 168-70 (1967); A Need for a Change, supra note 6, at 606, 608-14; Judicial Selection,
supra note 1, at 269.
- See, e.g., Alfini, The Judicial Selection Puzzle, 12 TIAL 9, 27 (1976) where a noted pro-
appointment advocate acknowledged:
Although the author intuitively agrees with these national standards [favoring
the merit system], it must be pointed out, in all fairness, that there is no empirical
evidence to support this position. No comprehensive study of judicial selection
methods has compared the qualifications of judges selected under the various plans
in an effort to demonstrate that judges selected under any one plan are better than
those selected under the other plans.
See also Escovrrz, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 1-2 (Am. Judicial Soc. 1975); WATKINS &
DOWLING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR 343-48 (1969); Atkins, Merit Selection of State
Judges, 50 FLA. B.J. 203, 209 (1976). Similar statements are consistently made by the pro-
selection forces. See, e.g., Testimony of Civil Court Judge Arthur E. Blyn and Supreme Court
Justice Frank O'Connor before the Select Task Force, quoted in Hearing Airs Views on
Picking Judges, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
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appointed by the chief executive, generally to fill vacancies or in-
terim positions.9 Hence, the suggestion that the problem lies solely
with the use of election and that a switch to appointment will sud-
denly elevate the judiciary several notches is unsupported. By the
same token, this same fact should have long ago dispelled the pro-
phesy of pro-election advocates that a switch to appointment would
inject elitism and classism into our judicial system.'0
Facing other realities is long overdue by both sides. It is true,
for instance, that our present system is not a complete failure; as
the pro-electionists are quick to point out, it has produced many
great judges." Yet, this fact proves very little. It does not prove that
the present system does not need and cannot stand improvement. 2
It is significant that many of the most vocal advocates for change
and reform are highly regarded judges that the current system has
I See Allard, Application of the Missouri Court Plan to Judicial Selection and Tenure
in America Today, 15 ButFAw L. REv. 378, 378-84 (1966); Hall, Merit Selection and Merit
Election of Judges, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 169 (1967); Henderson & Sinclair, The Selection of Judges
in Texas, 5 Hous. L. REv. 430, 442 (1968); Thompson, Selection of Judges of the California
Court of Appeal, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 381, 381-82 (1973); Utter, Selection and Retention-A
Judge's Perspective, 48 WASH. L. REv. 839, 842 (1973).
10 But see Roth, Why I Am Against the California Merit Plan, The Missouri Plan-Or
Any Reasonable Facsimile Thereof, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 346, 354 (1967); O'Connor, Should
State's Top Judges be Appointed? No, Newsday, Nov. 3, 1977, at 94, col. 3. See generally
Wormuth & Rich, Politics, the Bar and the Selection of Judges, 3 UTAH L. Rv. 459 (1958).
In some states it has only been through appointment that minority judges have reached the
bench. See Jasen, An Elected Judge Favors Merit Selection, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 1977, at 1,
col. 1, wherein the author notes: "The appointive system, it has been said, will work against
qualified women, blacks and other current minorities. One need only look to California, an
appointing state, to refute this argument. A woman and a black, both found well qualified,
were recently appointed to its highest court." But see Crockett, Judicial Selection and the
Black Experience, 58 JunicATU= 438 (1975). In New York, the first black judge to sit on the
Court of Appeals, Harold Stevens, was appointed to that post and then defeated in the next
election. See generally C. PHn', P. NF.IEISKI & A. PRms, WHERE Do JUDGES CoME FRoM?
(Inst. of Judicial Ad. 1976). Interestingly, Judge Stevens has been an open advocate of
election of judges rather than appointment. Judges Fuld and Stevens Comment on Carey's
Judicial Reform Proposal, Vesey Street Letter, at 5 (June 1976). By way of contrast, in
Florida, Justice Joseph Hatchett was appointed to become the first black Supreme Court
Justice and was then reelected in a general election. Karl, Electing Supreme Court Justices
-For the Last Time, 60 JuDicATraE 290, 292 (1977).
" See, e.g., Desmond, 6 Good Judges-An Argument in Support of Elective Process,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1974, at 25, col. 1; O'Connor, note 10 supra.
In the words of Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme Court:
As head of the California judiciary, I speak perhaps as an interested party for
the proposed judicial selection plan. If we ever could have afforded patronage as
the basis for selecting our judges, we can no longer do so under the pressure that
the dramatic social changes of the last half of the twentieth century are imposing
upon our court system.
Workbook Prepared for the Citizens' Committee on the Merit Plan for Judicial Selection, 43
CAL. ST. B.J. 153, 162 (1968). See generally Allard, Application of the Missouri Court Plan
to Judicial Selection and Tenure in America, 15 BurrAw L. REv. 378, 385 (1966).
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
produced.3 Even those judges leading the fight for continuation of
our elective system openly acknowledge and advocate reform, albeit
of a less radical nature than a complete switch to merit appoint-
ment."
Regrettably, but understandably, much of the blame for the
absence of compromise lies largely with the reformers, principally
those favoring merit appointment. They fear that to agree on a
compromise will result in a judicial "Berlin wall," hindering any
chance for the longrun adoption of full merit selection. 5 Buoyed by
their 1977 success, they believe they must not yield now. 6 They
would do well to show flexibility, not only because their opponents
appear ready to compromise,17 but because they may not have pro-
perly gauged either the benefits that compromise can produce or the
view of the public."
Moreover, it would appear to be self-deluding to believe that
the political leaders will not vigorously oppose such reforms at the
local level. 9 The late State Senator Bernard Gordon, former head
11 See Rosenman, A Better Way to Select Judges, 48 JUDICATURE 86 (1964); Goldstein,
New York's Chief Judge Scores Failure of Bills to Change Courts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1977,
at 30, col. 3; Judges Fuld and Stevens, Comment on Carey's Judicial Reform Proposal,
VEsn STREET LE'rrm, at 1, (June 1976) (remarks of Judge Fuld). See also Botein, Judges and
Their Critics: A Need for Understanding, N.Y.L.J. Jan. 24, 1973, at S-i, col. 3.
" See C. PHUiP, P. NEjELsKi & A. PRESS, WHERE Do JUDGES COME FROM? 118 (Inst. of
Judicial Ad. 1976) (quoting Judge Fuchsberg's Letter to the Editor, N.Y.L.J.); O'Connor, An
Argument for the Election of Judges, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1976, at 2, col. 3.
11 One cannot ignore the fact that, during the past 30 years, most of the states in the
union have adopted merit selection for at least some of their courts. See note 174 infra. It is
significant, however, that many of the states which have adopted merit selection-including
Missouri, which was the first to do so-have adopted it only for some of their appellate courts,
and not their trial courts. New York has, of course, adopted merit selection for its highest
court.
" It should be noted that the failure to enact proposals for a constitutional amendment
to extend merit selection to the trial courts this year means that the earliest that such
proposals could become effective would be 1982. See, e.g., Hochberger, No Chance Seen Now
to Extend Merit Selection of Judges, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 3. This is because a
constitutional amendment must be passed by two separately elected legislatures before it is
even submitted to the voters for approval. See N.Y. CONsT. art. XIX, §§ 1-2. See also Abrams,
Getting Better Judges, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1976, at 31, col. 2; COMMrrEE ON STATE COURTS
OF SUPERIOR JURISDICTION, A Proposal to Restructure the Judicial District Nominating Con-
vention System, 32 REc. OF N.Y.C.B.A. 615, 618 (1977).
,1 See, e.g., O'Connor, An Argument for the Election of Judges, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1976,
at 2, col. 3.
1S The most recent indications are that the public is not ready for a full switch to
appointment. See, e.g., Fowler, Carey's Proposals for Court Reorganization Jeopardized by
Partisan Disputes in Albany, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1977, at 25, col. 1.
11 Fox, Court Reform: Final Approval Sought in Albany, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1977, at 1,
col. 2; Freedman, Implementing of Court Reforms to Get Priority from Albany, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
24, 1978, at 1, col. 2; Hochberger, No Chance Seen Now to Extend Merit Selection of Judges,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
[Vol. 53:466
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of the Select Task Force on Court Reorganization, reached the con-
clusion that obtaining legislative approval for a switch to merit
selection at the trial level was so highly unlikely that to include it
in a constitutional amendment for reform of the judiciary would
cause the defeat of the entire amendment.20 Thus resulted the com-
promise whereby the voters in 1977 were asked to adopt merit selec-
tion only for the court of appeals.2 Senator Gordon and others in
the fight correctly realized that the real interest of politicians is in
the lower level courts where there are many judgeships and where
public visibility is much more unlikely.Y
The legislators need not look far for support for their dogged
protection of elective judicial selection. A 1976 statewide poll by the
Gannett newspapers showed that a surprising seventy-five per cent
of persons polled favored continued election of judges; only twenty-
one per cent favored appointment.2 While roughly the same had
been true in a 1973 poll relating to the court of appeals, the poll had
shown that the voters were more interested in the selection of court
of appeals judges and were concerned about their lack of meaningful
information and knowledge of the candidates.24 The public is also
generally aware that United States Supreme Court justices are ap-
pointed by the executive and, thus, more likely to accept that notion
for the highest court of the state.2I
More to the point, it is at the trial level that reform is particu-
larly important.2 1 It is there that the public has actual contact with
judges, and it is there that the proposed reforms may sound to the
2 See note 2 supra.
21 Fitzhugh, 'First Step'In State Court Reform Hailed, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1976, at 1, col.
2.
An important factor which contributed to the success of the 1977 amendment was that,
in the area of high court selection, New York was in a distinct minority. See Jasen, An Elected
Judge Favors Merit Selection, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1. The other states were
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, Illinois and New Mexico. Id. at n.1. Some commentators felt that this gave
the impression that New York was lagging behind the nation. See, e.g., Shestakofsky, Should
State's Top Judges Be Appointed? Yes, Newsday, Nov. 3, 1977, at 94, col. 1.
23 Gordon, Judicial Reform, A Legislative Viewpoint, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J., 284, 285-86
(1976).
z" C. PHILIP, P. NEJELSKI & A. PRESS, WHERE Do JUDGES COME FROM? 102-06 (Inst. of
Judicial Ad. 1976).
2 See H. JONES, THE COURT, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAw ExPLOSION 124-45 (1965), reprinted
in R. LOWE, RESOURCE MATERIALS FOR NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE 55 (Am. Jud. Soc'y 1974).
" See generally JONES, supra note 25; Task Force Report, The Challenge of Crime in a
Free Society, reprinted in, SELEcTED READINGS ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 214 (G.
Winters ed. 1973). See also Sarat, Understanding Trial Courts: A Critique of Social Science
Approaches, 61 JUDICATURE 318 (1978).
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public like efforts to affect them directly.Y It is the trial judge whose
performance represents the judicial system in the public's mind.,-
In the words of Columbia Law School Professor Harry W. Jones:
The trial judge is the parish priest of our legal order. The
impression that prevails in society concerning the justice or injus-
tice of our legal institutions depends almost entirely on the pro-
priety, efficiency, and humaneness of observed trial court func-
tioning. "Important as it is that people should get justice," said
the Victorial chancellor, Lord Herschell, "it is even more impor-
tant that they be made to feel and see that they are getting it."
• . . The typical citizen will never see an appellate court in action,
but there is every likelihood that he will sooner or later be drawn
into the operation of one or another of our trial courts whether as
litigant, witness or juryman.29
Another reason for compromise is the lack of uniformity even
among pro-appointment advocates. There are approximately a
dozen variants of the merit selection plan and there has been consid-
erable debate as to which is best or even acceptable .3 Most of the
pro-appointment reform groups favor a version of the so-called Mis-
2 As Yale University political science professor Austin Sarat recently explained:
The trial courts are the primary objects of increasing public dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice. This dissatisfaction is linked to a marked escalation in
the expectations which citizens have for the law. Legal remedies now are deemed
appropriate for a vast array of social problems which were formerly dealt with
privately within the context of families, schools and churches. Paradoxically, the
public seems to expect more from the law and the courts and not to like what it
gets.
Sarat, supra note 26, at 319. See generally Walker, Contact and Support: An Empirical
Assessment of Public Attitudes Toward the Police and the Courts, 51 N.C. L. RPv. 43, 71-76
(1972).
28 As stated in S. Escovrrz, JUDIcIAL SELECTION AND TENURE (Am. Jud. Soc'y 1975): "For
most individuals the [trial] judge is the law; what happens to an individual in a particular
courtroom on a particular day probably is all the justice he or she is going to get from the
system." Id. at 1.
" JONES, supra note 25, at 125, reprinted in R. LowE, RESOURCE MATERIALS FOR NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 56 (Am. Jud. Soc'y 1974). See Chandler, The
Role of the Trial Judge in the Anglo-American Legal System, 50 A.B.A.J. 125 (1964). United
States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo once said: "In the long run, there is no
guarantee of justice except the personality of the judge." R. LowE, RESOURCE MATERIALS FOR
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE, 55 (Am. Jud. Soc'y 1974).
28 The differences among the various plans are succinctly summarized in Atkins, Merit
Selection of State Judges, 50 FLA. B. J. 203, 204-07 (1976). Detailed descriptions of the
selection plans in effect in the various states are included in AMERICAN JUncATURE SOCmTY,
VOLUNTARY MERIT SELECTION PLANS (Rep. No. 36 1972); AMERICAN JUDICATURE SocIETY, THE
EXTENT OF ADOPTION OF THE MERIT PLAN OF JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE (Rep. No. 18
1970); Seiler, supra, note 6, at 788-96; Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 326-53.
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souri Plan, whereby a blue-ribbon nominating panel screens and
proposes potential appointees before selection.3' Former Chief Judge
Breitel, however, was on record in favor of the California Plan under
which appointees are approved after the governor has already se-
lected them.3 2 That kind of disagreement stalled and almost blocked
entirely the implementing legislation which was drafted to make the
1977 constitutional amendment for court of appeals' judges a real-
ity.33
Recent outcries of criticism about appointment to the federal
bench, previously considered above such problems, also may cause
a certain hesitancy on the part of many to accept an appointive
system .3 This criticism improperly lumps merit selection with mere
appointment and fails to take account of the recent adoption of a
merit selection system for federal appellate appointments.-" It also
*1 See generally A. AsHmAN & J. ALFiNi, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE
NOMINATING PROCESS (1974).
31 See N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1975, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, May 2, 1975, at 4, col. 5; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 1975, at 38, col. 2.
" See N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1978, at 36, col. 3 (Letter to Editor from Schair and Sperling).
The fact that a shift to appointment will require a constitutional amendment must also be
considered. Amendment is a long and arduous process, requiring two consecutive legislative
approvals by separately elected legislatures and then submission to and approval by the
public. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, §§ 1-2.
If to adopt a compromise will make the success of an amendment less likely, that fact
should tell reformers something about the acceptability of our reform proposals. Millions of
dollars have already been spent and scores of editorials written and broadcast to "educate"
the public on this issue. Yet, as already noted, there has been no ground swell movement for
merit selection. Some of this, to be sure, is due to general remoteness between the public and
the courts. See, e.g., Hentel, Where Has Greatness Gone?, 46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 243, 247-48 (1974);
Winter, Judicial Selection and Tenure, SELECTED READINGS ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE
19, 23 (G. Winters ed. 1973); A Need for Change, supra note 6, at 618; Judicial Selection,
supra note 1, at 287-94. The same phenomenon has been observed in England, sometimes
leading to rather harsh criticism of the bench:
The English bench has often been criticized for being conservative and remote
from the community.
The isolation of the English bench from the community has led to charges that
judges fail to understand what the man in the street means by his words, are slow
to recognize social trends, and are less capable of appreciating the weakness of
human nature than is the intelligent man of the world.
Shetreet, A Changing Society, A Changing Judiciary on Both Sides of the Atlantic, 60
JUDICATURE 332, 333 (1977).
Those who favor merit selection tend to be people who work with or in the courts. Those
opposed are often politicians and other persons who reason on the basis of political philoso-
phy; but, as the reformers must concede, there are notable and distinguished exceptions to
this observation. See, e.g., Rosenman, A Better Way to Select Judges, 48 JUDICATURE 86
(1964).
" See discussion at notes 190-95 and accompanying text infra.
' When President Carter was elected, he immediately adopted merit selection procedure
19791
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ignores the preconfirmation screening done by the American Bar
Association and the Senate Judiciary Committee and the preselec-
tion screening procedures which both United State Senators in New
York have used for the past decade." Nevertheless, whether or not
justified, this criticism of the federal system appears to pose an
unexpected hindrance to pro-appointment advocates.
Another deterrent to reform is the continued belief of many that
the problem can be cured simply by improving the mechanism for
judicial discipline and the overseeing of judicial conduct. The Tem-
porary State Commission on the Courts (The Dominick Commis-
sion), for example, strongly advocated improving the procedures for
disciplining and removing judges, but favored retention of the
elective system of selecting judges for the trial courts.17 The Com-
mission on Judicial Conduct, which grew out of the Dominick Com-
mission's study and the work of the Joint Legislative Committee on
Court Reorganization in the early 1970's, 3s has certainly helped to
improve the bench. But such after-the-fact reform efforts fail to
correct the source of the problem. It is difficult to quarrel with the
contention that we should attempt to keep inferior or mediocre
judges off the bench in the first place,39 leaving to the. Commission
on Judicial Conduct the task of correcting any errors that may slip
by the pre-selection screening process." Yet the belief that the
for the United States Courts of Appeals. See Carter Establishes Merit Selection of Appellate
Judges, but Yields to Senators on District Courts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1977, at A-28, col. 1.
While praised for that effort, he has also been criticized for failing to extend the same
procedure to the district courts. See, e.g., The Aspen Symposium on the Federal Judiciary,
62 JuDicATuRE 150 (1978).
11 Several Senators have used screening committees on a voluntary basis for many years.
See Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALZ L.J.
657 (1970); Grossman, The Role of the American Bar Association in the Selection of Federal
Judges: Episodic Involvement to Institutionalized Power, 17 VAND. L. REV. 785 (1964); Percy,
No Royal Road to Justice, 60 JUDicATURE 184, 185 (1976); Scott, The Selection of Federal
Judges, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 205 (1967); Totenberg, Will Judges Be Chosen Rationally?,
60 JUDicATURE 92, 94-96 (1976); Kohn, Federal Judicial Selection-How it Works, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 9, 1976, at 1, col. 2. See generally Tydings, Merit Selection for District Judges, 61
JUDiCATuRE 112 (1977); Winters, Merit Selection of Federal Judges, Symposium on Judicial
Administration and Legal Reform, 60 Ky. L. REV. 872 (1972).
"N.Y. TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON Tm N.Y. STATE Courr SYSTEM (Dominick Commis-
sion) at 54-55 (1973), reprinted in Klein & Witztum, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1972-1973,
ANNUAL SuvaY OF AmmcAN LAW 717, 718-19 (1973).
33 The Court of Appeals recently adopted rules of procedure for the review of determina-
tions by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. See Review Rules Issued for Panel
Findings on Judicial Conduct, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
See, e.g., Reath, In Support of Constitutional Revision to Provide Merit Selection of
All Judges, 45 PA. B.Q. 406,407 (1974); Seller, Judicial Selection in New Jersey, 5 Saros HALL
L. REv. 721, 737-39 (1974).
,0 For a thorough discussion of the possible processes to correct such errors, see Judicial
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disciplinary process is an adequate safeguard in itself has hindered
reform efforts, particularly those favoring a radical change in the
mode of selection.
One hundred years of relenting and unresolved debate without
significant change should be enough to warrant a brief pause to
consider compromise. The debate can go on, but this should not
preclude temporary compromise reforms.
III. POSSIBLE COMPROMISES
Several partial or temporary reforms are available and may be
adopted to resolve the impasse which appears to be blocking im-
provement of the selection process. These are not mutually exclu-
sive, nor do they necessarily relate to the same facets of the judicial
selection problem. Most can be instituted by mere legislation,
rather than constitutional amendment, and therefore can be accom-
plished without inordinate delay.
A. Mandatory Preselection Screening
Most reformers agree that the key element of any merit plan is
its mechanism for mandatory preselection screening of possible ju-
dicial appointees." Yet, the legislation which would institute such
a procedure has not gained sufficient sponsorship among the reform-
ers to achieve adoption.2
The principal features which would underlie a plan of manda-
tory preselection screening are the following. Blue-ribbon screening
committees would be created for each judicial district and judicial
department in the state. 3 The screening committees would be of
moderate size (ten to fifteen persons), with a membership of laymen
as well as lawyers representing a broad cross section of the com-
Discipline and Disability Symposium, 54 CEU.-KET L. REv. 1 (1977). See also notes 163-64
infra.
41 See A. ASHMAN & J. ALFin, THE KEy To JuDICiAL MERrr SELECTION: THE NOMINATING
PROcESS 22-23 (1974); Sheldon, Searching for Judges in Oregon: Where Would the Bar Look
for Help?, 61 JuDIcATuRE 376 (1978). Significantly, the leading advocates of an elective system
also have expressed openness to the idea of mandatory preselection screening. See, e.g.,
O'Connor, An Argument for the Election of Judges, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1976, at 2, col. 3.
" See Alfini, The Judicial Selection Puzzle, 12 TRAL 11 (1976); Kaminsky, A Proposal
for Mandatory Preselection Screening for State Court Judges, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 516, 520-
22 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kaminsky Ill.
3 The same system of blue-ribbon screening committees is used by Governor Carey in
making his appointments. It also features nominating commissions for the judicial districts.
See Exec. Order No. 5 (1975); Rubin, Judicial Screening by Governor's Committee, N.Y.L.J.,
July 27, 1976, at 1, col. 2. Cf. Glasser, Fuchsberg: Smooth Shift from Advocate to Judge,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 7, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (arguing for preselection screening by the entire bar, not
merely by screening committees).
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munity they serve.44 These committees would undertake a thorough
review of the qualifications of each designee for judicial office re-
gardless of whether the candidate is a proposed appointee or a nomi-
nee for elected office.4 Statutory subpoena power and the ability to
require written responses to questions," together with proper staff-
ing and funding, 7 would be provided to enable the committees to
investigate and review each candidate thoroughly. Following its re-
view, the committee would issue a written report, detailing its find-
ings and reasoning with respect to the candidate." No candidate
would be permitted to become a judge unless found qualified by the
appropriate screening committee."
While there has been much debate over the constitutionality"
or the propriety of making some of these goals express statutory
requirements, there appears to be no dispute that they would be
intended by whatever implementing language is used. Some propos-
als have grappled directly with the potential problems of the proce-
dures for the screening committees,' the tenure and possible re-
,, See, e.g., Robertson & Gordon, Merit Screening of Judges in Massachusetts: The
Experience of the Ad Hoc Committee, 58 MAss. L.Q. 131, 138 (1973); Sheldon, supra note
41, at 378; A Need for Change, supra note 6, at 630. Some have criticized lay membership
on the ground that lay members will be unduly influenced by the lawyers on the commit-
tees. See Niles, The Changing Politics of Judicial Selection: A Merit Plan for New York, 22
REc. oF N.Y.C.B.A. 242, 249-50 (1967). Most persons, however, who have direct experience
with the functioning of nominating committees speak up and act as a constructive check on
the lawyers. See Robertson & Gordon, supra, at 138; Sheldon, supra note 41, at 378; Winters,
One-Man Judicial Selection, 45 JUDiCATURE 198, 201:02 (1962). See also ASHMAN & ALsmI,
supra note 41, at 38-40. Thus, Governor Carey's voluntary merit plan for judicial appoint-
ments includes laymen on the nominating committees. See note 43 supra.
A study of the federal merit selection committees used by President Carter for the United
States Courts of Appeals also appears to corroborate the desirability of having lay persons
and a broad diversification of community representation on the committees. See Carbon, The
U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission: A Comparison of Two of Its Panels, 62
JUDICATURE 233, 235 (1978).
' See Curtiss, Screening Judicial Candidates for Election, 59 JUDCATURE 320 (1976);
Kaminsky II, supra note 42, at 530-32.
41 Fish, Questioning Judicial Candidates: What Can Merit Selectors Ask?, 62 JuDicATUR
8, 14-16 (1978); Kaminsky, supra note 42, at 547; Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 308.
11 Kaminsky II, supra note 42, at 552; A Need for Change, supra note 6, at 633.
18 Kaminsky 11, supra note 42, at 547-48. There has been much debate over the advisabil-
ity and propriety of making public the committee's report. Those in favor feel that it is of
primary importance to educate the people regarding the candidates. Critics of this aspect of
the screening process feel that it is more important to preserve confidentiality. See notes 57-
64 infra.
,1 Hunting, Toward the Best Possible Judges, 15 Rnc. oF N.Y.C.B.A. 400, 405-06 (1960);
Kaminsky I, supra note 42, at 530'.
5 See Curtiss, supra note 45, at 322. See also Rosenthal v. Harwood, 35 N.Y.2d 469, 323
N.E.2d 179, 363 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1974).
51 See Carbon, supra note 44, at 243-45; Fish, Questioning Judicial Candidates: What
19791 JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM
moval of committee members, 5 the scope of investigatory and sub-
poena power the committee should have" and the degree of confi-
dentiality which is to clothe its activities. Whether these matters
are expressly provided for in the statute or constitutional amend-
ment which adopts a preselection screening plan or are left to later
legislation or rulemaking by the screening committee themselves,
their resolution is necessary if the plan is to function effectively.5
One of the most significant issues is whether the information
obtained by the screening committees and their reports should be
confidential or public. 8 On the one hand, it is argued that a promise
of confidentiality is necessary in order to enable the committees to
obtain information and to avoid discouraging able candidates from
allowing their names to be considered." The committees must seek
Can Merit Selectors Ask?, 62 JUDICATURE 8 (1978); Robertson & Gordon, supra note 44; Rubin,
supra note 43.
52 See, e.g., Kaminsky H, supra note 42, at 552-53.
13 See note 46 supra.
u Atkins, Merit Selection of State Judges, 50 FiA. B.J. 203, 207 (1976); Carbon, supra
note 44, at 245; Greenberg, The Task of Judging the Judges, 59 JUDicATUR 458, 463 (1976);
Nelson, Carter's Merit Plan: A Good First Step, 61 JuDrnTcuRE 105, 111 (1977).
The interests involved in the confidentiality question are aptly summarized by one
commentator as follows:
On the one hand is the right of the public to know as much as possible about a
commission's activities and particularly the candidates up for consideration. On
the other hand is the right of the applicant to be assured some anonymity and
spared the embarassment of rejection. Also, its business in an atmosphere free of
external pressures and influences from political organizations and other special
interest groups.
ASHMAN & ALFI, supra note 41, at 55.
0 One of the procedural issues that probably should be resolved at the outset is whether
there should be a procedure for appeal from or review of a determination by the screening
committees. An appeal mechanism built into the plan itself would seem unnecessarily costly
and complex. The courts, however, could provide a forum for appeal and protection from
arbitrary and abusive decisions via Article 78-type proceedings. New York's Civil Practice
Law & Rules (CPLR) § 7803 provides for review of administrative determinations as follows:
The only questions that may be raised in a proceeding under this article are:
3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was af-
fected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion,
including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline
imposed; or
4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held, and at which
evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law is, on the entire record, supported
by' substantial evidence.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7803 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1978-1979).
' Studies of various federal and state merit plan nominating commissions show signifi-
cant differences of approach to the confidentiality question. Almost all conduct their deliber-
ations in confidence, but not all keep their results confidential after their deliberations are
over. See, e.g., Atkins, supra note 54, at 207.
" See, e.g., D. Kelley, Colorado's Merit Selection Plan, at 7 (Am. Jud. Soc'y 1969). It is
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out and be able to obtain both favorable and unfavorable informa-
tion. On the other hand, an important function of screening is to
generate, and make public, important information about the candi-
date to help the voters or appointing executive become knowledgea-
ble about his or her qualifications relative to those of other potential
candidates.-" Indeed, in an election situation, failure to make the
details of the committee's findings public would deflate one of the
primary purposes for its being, namely, to help overcome the lack
of knowledge about the candidates.59 In addition, public confidence
in the screening process can best be stimulated by openness."
One possible way to resolve the debate over confidentiality
might be to conduct the preselection screening on a confidential
basis up to the point of issuance of the committee's report. Shortly
before the report is to be made public, the committee would show
it to the candidate and give him or her an opportunity to withdraw
his or her name from consideration. If the candidate withdraws, the
report would then be kept confidential and not be made public."
Such a procedure might strike a reasonable balance between the two
contradictory views on the issue of confidentiality. But it would not
be foolproof. Some of the most obvious problems still to be resolved
would be: What use should be made of the report if the candidate
runs or is to be appointed for office in the future?62 How can the
committees protect against leaks? Should there be any public state-
ment of the candidate's withdrawal and, if so, in what form and by
also argued that confidentiality is necessary to insulate the screeners from public pressure
and attempts to influence their findings. See In re Baumgarten (Koch), N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27,
1978, at 55, col. 2, a recent decision where the Supreme Court, New York County held that
an unsuccessful candidate for appointment to the New York City Criminal Court could not
obtain access to the Mayor's Committee's files on his candidacy. The court stated: "It seems
almost beyond question that if the files of the Mayor's committee were subject to disclosure,
the free flow of information to the committee and particularly adverse comments would slow
to a trickle or dry up completely." Id. at col. 4; ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 41, at 55.
See Carbon, supra note 44, at 245.
" See Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 307.
See ASHMAN & ALFiN, supra note 41, at 57. In one recent study of a merit system
nominating commission in North Carolina, one author concluded: "As confidentiality cloaked
panel proceedings, slings and arrows of criticism necessarily targeted on a stage directly
involving the candidates as participants." Fish, supra note 51, at 11.
11 See Kaminsky II, supra note 42, at 549. See also Lowe, Merit Selection in the Equality
State, 59 JUDICATURE 328, 332 (1976).
62 At least one of Governor Carey's voluntary merit plan commissions requires that its
findings on persons not recommended to the Governor for appointment be made "unavailable
for further consideration after the Governor has filled the position," so that the Committee
will "make a fresh appraisal" of all candidates when a new vacancy is created. Rubin,
Judicial Screening by Governor's Committee, N.Y.L.J., July 27, 1976, at 1, col. 2, at 5, col.
4. See also Rejected Bench Candidate Blocked From Seeing Judicial Panel's Files, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 27, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
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whom? The presence of these and other potential problems should
not, however, bar an attempt at institution of such a compromise.
The problems and open questions are not insurmountable, and the
beneficial end results still appear to far outweigh leaving things in
status quo under the present selection system.
Indeed, mandatory preselection screening would produce many
benefits in comparison to the present system. Foremost of these
would be greater education of the public regarding judicial candi-
dates and their qualifications. 3 Voter knowledge of judicial candi-
dates is one of the few areas where there is a fair amount of statisti-
cal information. Several studies of voter knowledge and interest
have been done in the past two decades; all have produced roughly
the same findings. Voters feel that they do not know enough about
judical candidates to cast meaningful votes. As a result, they tend
either to ignore judical elections altogether or to vote by blind or
random choice." Given public circulation, the screening report
could help to reduce significantly this voter apathy and to produce
more informed voting.
3 In one study, three political science professors at Texas Tech University questioned
and interviewed voters in Lubbock, Texas regarding their experience in the November 1976
election of state court judges there. Only 15.4% could name an appellate court judge for whom
they voted. The principal reason given by the voters for their problems with voting in judicial
elections was "the inadequacy of information provided them before the judicial elections."
The study therefore concluded:
[W]e think this situation could be remedied if such groups as the state bar, the
League of Women Voters, political parties, and other sources assumed a more active
role in informing the public about judicial elections and more widely disseminated
information about those who aspire to judicial office. Without such efforts, it is
unlikely that judicial elections will fulfill their democratic purposes.
McKnight, Schaefer & Johnson, Choosing Judges: Do the Voters Know What They're Doing?,
62 JUDICATURE at 99 (1978). See generally Beechem, Can Judicial Elections Express People's
Choice, 57 JUDIcATURE 242, 244-45 (1974); Haggart, The Case for the Nebraska Merit Plan,
41 NEB. L. REv. 723, 733 (1962); Klots, How Much Do Voters Know or Care About Judicial
Candidates?, 38 JUDICATURE 141 (1955); Klots, The Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot,
10 REC. OF N.Y.C.B.A. 103 (1955); Van Osdol, Politics and Judicial Selection, 28 ALA. LAw.
167, 168-70 (1967); Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 293-94. In New York, for example,
following the 1973-1974 races for court of appeals judgeships, the Institute for Judicial Admin-
istration polled voters on several questions ranging from whether they preferred election to
appointment of judges to why they did not vote (if they had not) in the judicial election. In
response to the latter question, 72% of the persons polled said they had not known enough
about the candidates; only 18% said they had not cared enough about the outcome to vote.
C. Pwup, P. N'EmsKu & A. PESS, Wmmz Do JuDGEs COM FROM? 103 (Inst. of Jud. Ad.
1976). Other studies in the 1950's and 1960's of voter participation in New York are detailed
and discussed in Kaminsky, supra note 1 at 512.
11 See Hall, Merit Selection and Merit Election of Judges, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 169, 170 (1967);
Lyman, Connecticut and the Missouri Plan, 30 CONN. B.J. 390, 391 (1956); Parsons, The
Selection and Tenure of Florida Supreme Court Justices, 9 MAMI L.Q. 271, 276 (1955); Tim
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE CoURTs, at 66-68 (1967).
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In appointment situations, the screening process can also create
increased visibility and thus stimulate better appointments. The
resulting detailed knowledge about the potential nominees should
assist the appointing executive to make more informed appointment
decisions. 5 It can also act as a deterrent to appointments for reasons
other than merit, since the appointing executive will know that the
public or legislators to whom the executive is himself responsible
and answerable have the same information about his appointees as
the executive himself.
The mandatory preselection screening process, while undoubt-
edly discouraging some persons who shun public scrutiny, 8 should
nevertheless help to stimulate more able persons to apply for or
allow themselves to be proposed for judgeships. 7 If the screeners
perform as contemplated, public confidence in the judiciary should
increase markedly. More able persons may come forward if the pol-
itical stigma attached to state judgeships is removed, or even merely
lessened.68 Studies in other states have shown this to be a serious
problem under the elective system.6 9
One criticism sometimes raised to the mandatory screening
concept is that it is unnecessary because local bar associations and
political organizations already do screening on a voluntary basis.70
11 Glen R. Winters, former Executive Director of the American Judicature Society, which
was organized as a non-profit body in 1913 for the specific purpose of improving the quality
of the judiciary, has described the role of merit plan nominating commissions as follows:
The true nature of the judicial nominating commission is a group of people of
intelligence and responsibility unconnected with government and politics who can
relieve the governor of some of the labor of making appointments and supply a non-
partisan objectivity that will make for higher grade judicial personnel.
Winters, One-Man Judicial Selection, 45 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 198, 202 (1962), reprinted in
SELECTED READINGS ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE, at 88 (G. Winters ed. 1973).
68 See Volcansek-Clark, Why Lawyers Become Judges, 62 JUDIcATURE 166, 168 (1978).
' See Henderson & Sinclair, The Selection of Judges in Texas, 5 Hous. L. REv. 430, 459
(1968); Lowe, supra note 61 at 335-36.
" Indeed, the screening plan does not require or contemplate that the politicians will be
the only proposers of potential judicial candidates or appointees; there is no reason why
persons could not submit their own names or those of colleagues to the screening committees.
This procedure is followed by the nominating committees which suggest appointments to
Governor Carey under the voluntary merit system instituted when he took office. See Rubin,
supra note 43, at 5, col. 4.
e' See Henderson & Sinclair, supra note 67, at 459.
See Buckley, The "Nassau Plan" for Selection of Better Judges, 34 N.Y. ST. B.J. 345,
345 (1962); Hentel, The "Queens Plan" For Selection of Better Judges, 34 N.Y. ST. B.J. 23
(1962); Roth, Why I am Against the California Merit Plan, the Missouri Plan-Or Any
Reasonable Facsimile Thereof, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 346, 351-54 (1967); Thompson, Selection of
Judges of the California Court of Appeals, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 381, 382 (1973); Utter, Selection
and Retention-A Judge's Perspective, 48 WASH. L. REv. 839, 842 (1973); Winters, Judicial
Selection and Tenure-The Missouri Plan, 58 ILL. B.J. 511, 521-23 (1970); Levine, Judicial
Screening-A Mix of Procedures, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 13, 1978, at 1, col. 2, at 3, col. 2.
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Bar associations, however, do not and cannot provide sufficient pro-
tections.7" Bar associations have only limited funds, personnel and
time to do judicial screening. As a result, they rarely do more than
interview the candidates, review their written summaries of past
experience and ask a few questions of references listed in those
summaries." Screening by the political parties is not materially
different. This process is also suspect since the parties' screeners do
not reveal who they reject as unqualified and since they are open to
charges of bias.73 They rarely screen persons other than active party
members or their personal choices for judgeships.7
Mandatory preselection screening under a formalized, well-
staffed and well-financed system should greatly improve upon the
present screening efforts in terms of results and public acceptability
of the screeners' conclusions. This is not to say that bar association
screening and screening by the political parties should be ended by
the adoption of official screening committees; the voluntary pro-
grams can and still should continue as a supplement to and poten-
tial check upon+ the official screeners.75
71 See Flanders, Evaluating Judges: How Should the Bar Do It?, 61 JUDICATURE 304, 305-
07 (1978); Golumb, Selection of the Judiciary: For Election, 24 N.Y. CoUNTY LAW. B. BuLL.
214, 218 (1967); McKnight, Schaefer & Johnson, Choosing Judges: Do the Voters Know What
They're Doing?, 62 JUDIcATURE 94, 99 (1978); Roth, supra note 70, at 354; Judicial Selection,
supra note 1, at 288.
" See Levine, supra note 70; see generally Philip, How BarAssociations Evaluate Sitting
Judges (Inst. of Jud. Ad. 1976); Reath, Judicial Evaluation-The Counterpart of Merit
Selection, 60 A.B.A.J. 1246 (1974). The experience of those participating in President Carter's
federal merit selection plan has indicated that even they feel that they have had insufficient
time and staff to do their screening work. Slotneck, What Panelists are Saying about the
Circuit Judge Nominating Commission, 62 JUDicATURE 320, 323 (1979).
This problem has been claimed to exist on some of the merit nominating committees
which President Carter has used to screen candidates for federal appellate appointments. See
Fish, supra note 51, at 11.
7" The acceptability and integrity of the results of bar and political screening committees
of one bar association often disagree with those of other bar associations and with those of
the political parties. Yet, they rarely elaborate upon or even make public their reasoning and
specific findings about the candidates. See, e.g., Hochberger, City Bar Defends Its Rating All
Court Candidates in City, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 2; Hochberger, City Bar Rating
of Candidates Revives Inter-County Dispute, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 2; Three Bar
Groups Rate Candidates For Judgeships, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 2; Bar Committees
Rate Candidates for Court Seats, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
71 In contrast Judge Jacob Fuchsberg, of the New York Court of Appeals, whose cam-
paigns for chief judge and associate judge of that court provoked heated controversy, wrote
in a 1973 letter to New York Law Journal:
. ..Rating of statewide candidates should be done jointly by all the dozens
of bar associations in our state instead of each pursuing its own predilections. It is
unseemly for associations to be vying with one another for jurisdiction and local
associations to be preempted on local judgeships. The rating body should be broad-
based. It should have objective standards. It should stay out of politics. It should
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The most serious and substantial doubts raised about the man-
datory screening concept relate to the selection of the screeners.5
Obviously, the screening process will only be as good as the people
who do it. Who will screen the screeners? How will they be selected?
What checks will there be on their conduct? Will we be merely
substituting the foibles and problems of dealing with their personal
qualities for those of the judicial candidates? The uncertainty of
answers to these questions, however, does not provide a sufficient
rationale for rejecting the screening process. Mandatory screening
will significantly improve the present system, and there are suitable
if imperfect answers to the above problems.
For example, a system could be provided whereby selection is
done by a mixed group of persons, including the presiding justices
of the appellate division and judicial districts, the state's chief
judge, and the Governor or local chief executive. 77 Since a primary
responsibility of the presiding and administrative judges is the pro-
per and efficient functioning of the courts under their supervision,78
they have a direct interest in seeking committee members who will
insure high quality on their courts. Any selections by executive and
legislative leaders will be subject to public scrutiny, and they can
be held accountable for the activities of their appointees. Thus, they
too have an incentive to appoint highly competent members to the
screening committees. 79 If the appointive method proves faulty or
pursue due process. It should refrain from public announcements containing lan-
guage which is misleading and which pretends to a degree of authoritative judgment
which it cannot truly make. It should not allow the impression of unanimity when
it does not exist nor fail to indicate that the judgment is that of a small committee
and not a mass of members.
Judge Fuchsberg, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.L.J., quoted in C. PHnU", P. NEJE1 KI & A. PRESS,
supra note 10, at 118. But see Desmond, "Merit Selection" Isn't The Easy Answer to Choose
Judges, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1975, at 25, col. 4, at 34, col. 3.
11 See Goldstein, Voters to Decide on Appointment of Judges, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1977,
§ B3, col. 3; O'Connor, Should State's Top Judges Be Appointed? No, Newsday, Nov. 3,
1977, at 94, cols. 3-4; A Need for Change, supra note 6, at 629. For example, a recent study
of the merit selection nominating commissions appointed by President Carter reveals that
87% of the members were Democrats and that a high percentage had been early participants
in the President's campaign. Slotneck, note 72 supra. See also Tolchin, Testing the Merit of
Carter's Merit Selection, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1978, § 4, at 14, cols. 1-3.
See, e.g., Kaminsky II, supra note 42, at 531-32.
7 The problem of over burdened courts is discussed in Bell, Toward a More Efficient
Federal Appeals System, 54 JUDICATURE 237 (1971); England & McMahon, Quantity Dis-
counts in Appellate Justice, 60 JUDICATURE 442 (1977); Wolfram, Notes From a Study of the
Caseload of the Minnesota Supreme Court: Some Comments and Statistics on Pressures and
Responses, 53 MINN. L. REv. 939 (1969). See also Botein, Judges and Their Critics: A Need
for Understanding, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1973, at S1, col. 3-4, at S9, cols. 3; Rosenberg,
Improving Selection of Judges on Merit, 56 JUDICATURE 240, 241 (1973).
Cf. Niles, The Changing Politics of Judicial Selection: A Merit Plan for New York, 22
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unsatisfactory then a partially appointive and partially elective
method may be worth trying.
By requiring that the committees be nonpartisan and be made
up of laymen as well as lawyers,"0 and by providing for tenure of
moderate duration and staggering the terms of the committee mem-
bers,"' the process can further guard against domination by any
particular group or person.8" The knowledge that their reports on the
candidates will be made public may also stimulate care and dili-
gence among the screeners.9s Finally, procedures can be provided for
REc. OF N.Y.C.B.A. 242, 257 (1967) (elected official as executive officer of judicial screening
commission will prevent nomination of social, religious, ethnic, or racial elite).
9 See ASMiAN & ALFINn, supra note 41, at 38-39; Fish, supra note 51, at 10; Robertson &
Gordon, Merit Screening of Judges in Massachusetts: The Experience of the Ad Hoc
Committee, 58 MAss. L.Q. 131, 132 (1973).
11 Staggered terms would insure that the majority of each committee consists of experi-
enced members.
u Some critics of merit selection have contended that the screening committees would
themselves become politicized. See Goldstein, Voters to Decide on Appointment of Judges,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1977, § B3, col. 3. Restrictions on the membership of the screening
committee, e.g., that they can hold no other political or governmental office at the same time
and that they cannot themselves seek judicial office for a moderate period after serving on
the screening committee, may help to insure that the interest of the screeners be confined to
their search for high quality judges.
0 Another difficult but important question is whether the screeners will really be able
to discern what makes a good judge. Much has been written on this problem, but it is far
from being resolved. See, e.g., Fenoglio, Citizens Size Up Their Judges, 59 JUDICATURE 472,
476 (1976); Fish, supra note 46; Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?,
44 Tax. L. Rav. 1063 (1966); Rubin, supra note 62; Sheldon, supra note 41; Van Osdol, Politics
and Judicial Selection, 28 ALA. LAw. 167, 174 (1967). Defining the qualities of "the bad judge"
is not too difficult. Aside from such obvious general qualities such as integrity, experience
and honesty, however, no one has been able to provide a suitable definition of "the good
judge."
Interestingly, several commentators on this subject are receptive to the "I know what it
is if I see it" approach. The same personal trait may be a positive or a negative in two different
people, depending on its mix with other qualities and the degree to which it is possessed.
Since all people are different, with their own individual qualities, the ultimatb test in screen-
ing must be an ad hoc one.
Professor Rosenberg cautioned, in what remains the leading article on this subject:
Necessarily, the criteria that can be marked out will not apply to every judge or
every court, for judges' functions are enormously diverse. Judicial behavior that is
deemed exemplary in one court may be unacceptable in another, depending on
whether the case at hand is civil or criminal, on trial or appeal, substantial or petty,
jury or nonjury, and so on.
Rosenberg, supra, at 1064.
A suggested check list of qualities to consider may be found in Lowe, Pennsylvania
Judicial Nominating Commissioners' Institute, reprinted in R. LowE, RESOURCE MATERIALS
FOR NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE, at 26-36 (Am. Jud. Soc'y.
1974).
Perhaps most difficult, it is almost impossible to predict what changes will occur in a
person when he or she ascends to the bench. See, e.g., Alpert, Atkins & Zieler, Becoming a
Judge: The Transition from Advocate to Arbiter, 62 JUDIcATURE 325 (1979).
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the possible removal of committee members who are derelict in their
duties, such as removal by majority or two thirds vote of either their
fellow committee members or those governmental and judicial offi-
cials with appointing responsibility under the screening plan.8
How efficiently and effectively the screening committees would
be able to handle their workloads, how much financing they would
need, and what procedures they would adopt are matters that will
depend to a great extent on the sincerity of the legislators who will
be enacting the screening system and voting on its powers and its
budget requests and constraints.85 If a mandatory preselection
screening plan is adopted, legislative cooperation and support will
be essential before any improvement in the present system can be
accomplished."
B. Alteration of the Nominating Process
Another line of constructive compromise proposals focuses on
the manner in which judical candidates are nominated for election.
The theory is simple: improve the nomination process and the qual-
ity of the nominees, and the quality of those elected will improve."
Before exploring those proposals, a brief review of the current nomi-
nating process and its pitfalls is in order. Surprisingly little is gener-
" See Kaminsky II, supra note 42, at 552-53.
" Several legislative "problems" surfaced during the 1978 legislative session in connec-
tion with the legislation proposed to implement the 1977 constitutional amendment for merit
appointment of court of appeals judges. The principal dispute involved the number of names
which would be submitted to the Governor for each appointment. The Governor wanted and
received a large number of candidates for each vacancy. The reformers, however, sought to
limit the number to between three and five, so that the Governor could not merely wait for
"a name, pre-selected for political or other reasons." They argued that "the longer the list
becomes, the more likely it is that choices will be made for considerations-especially politi-
cal-other than merit." N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1978, at 36, col. 3 (Letter to Editor from Schair
& Sperling). See also Schair, Court Reform: Looking Ahead at Plans, Priorities For This Year,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1978, at 23, col. 5, at 34, col. 2; Hochberger, Carey, Breitel Split on Issue
of Naming High Court's Judges, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 7, 1978, at 1, col. 2. For a detailed discussion
of the specific provisions of the implementing legislation, see Commission on the State Courts
of Superior Jurisdiction, Legislation Implementing the Court Reform Amendments, 33
RECORD 525 (1978).
u Serious questions have been raised about the constitutionality of a mandatory screen-
ing plan adopted by mere legislative statute. See generally Jardine, Ballot Access Rights: The
Constitutional Status of the Right to Run for Office, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 290, 317-31; Com-
ment, A New Dimension to Equal Protection and Access to the Ballot: American Party v.
White and Storer v. Brown, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 1293 (1975); Developments in the
Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. Rv. 1111, 1134-36 (1975). The more persuasive view appears to
be that, since the underlying purpose of the plan is to create and maintain a highly qualified
judiciary rather than restrict access to the ballot or the bench, a statutory plan would be
constitutional. See Curtiss, supra note 45, at 322-23.
" See notes 43 supra and 203 infra.
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ally known or written about this aspect of judical selection.
Article 6 of the New York State Constitution specifies that
justices of the supreme court and judges of the county courts, the
Civil Court of the City of New York and the Nassau County District
Court be elected by the voters at general election." The constitution
does not, however, specify how candidates for election to judical
office become nominated. Similarly, while article 6, section 20 of the
constitution prescribes certain requirements for election to judical
office, 9 none of those provisions relate specifically to the nominat-
ing process. The legislature has specified the method for nomination
of supreme court justices in Election Law § 6-106, which provides
for nomination by political party judicial nominating conventions
in each judicial district. 0
Election Law § 6-124 provides the procedure for constituting
the judicial conventions. 1 Each party is to hold a separate judicial
convention for each judicial election district. 2 Due to the constitu-
tional requirement that all voters have proportionate representa-
tion, 3 the districts are drawn on lines related to population size
rather than along county lines. Delegates to the judicial conventions
are elected by the public at the primary election immediately pre-
ceding the general election involved. The number of delegates is
computed by a formula based on the number of votes cast in the
district for the party's candidate in the last gubernatorial election,
u N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 6, 10, 12, 13 & 16.
', N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 20(a) requires supreme court justices and court of claims
judges to be "admitted to practice law in this state [for] at least ten years" and lower court
judges to be lawyers for at least 5 years. Furthermore, subdivision (b) provides that no judge
or justice may hold any other public or political office or engage in the practice of law while
on the bench.
0 The New York Election Law provides that "[p]arty nominations for the office of
justice of the supreme court shall be made by judicial district convention." N.Y. ELc. LAw.
§ 6-106 (McKinney 1978).
" The New York Election Law § 6-124 provides in part:
A judicial district convention shall be constituted by the election at the preceding
primary of delegates and alternate delegates, if any, from each assembly district
or, if an assembly district shall contain all or part of two or more counties and if
the rules of the party shall so provide, separately from the part of such assembly
district contained within each such county. The number of delegates and alter-
nates, if any, shall be determined by party rules ....
N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 6-124 (McKinney 1978).
32 The New York Constitution divides the state into eleven judicial districts. See N.Y.
CONsT. art. VI, §§ 4(a) & 6(a).
,3 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); In re Orans, 17 N.Y.2d 107, 216 N.E.2d
311, 269 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1966).
" See N.Y. ELEc. LAw § 6-124 (McKinney 1978); Wager v. New York State Bd. of
Elections, 59 App. Div. 2d 729,398 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't), affl'd, 42 N.Y.2d 1100, 369 N.E.2d
1192, 399 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1977).
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subject to the party's rules regarding the total number of candidates
involved. The rules for the time, place and procedure of the conven-
tions are left by Election Law § 6-126 to "a committee appointed
pursuant to the rules of the [party's] state committee."9 5 Provision
is made for the designation of a temporary convention chairperson
to be selected by roll call98 and for official minutes of the convention
to be kept and filed with the state board of elections or, in the case
of conventions in New York City, the board of elections of that city."
The statute requires that a quorum be present and the cases have
made clear that only delegates selected strictly in accordance with
the statutory procedure can constitute a quorum.' In the absence
of a properly constituted quorum, the convention and its nomina-
tions will be nullified by the courts."
11 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-126 (McKinney 1978). See Gilroy v. Lomenzo, 35 App. Div. 2d
746, 314 N.Y.S.2d 607 (3d Dep't 1970); Scully v. Lomenzo, 26 App. Div. 2d 118, 120, 271
N.Y.S.2d 875, 877-78 (4th Dep't 1966).
,1 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-126(2) (McKinney 1978). Early decisions clearly indicated that
the failure to have a roll call for temporary chairperson would be fatal to the legality of the
convention. See, e.g., French v. Roosevelt, 18 Misc. 307, 41 N.Y.S. 1080 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1896):
The necessity for such preliminary roll in such cases is plain; otherwise the officer
or person calling the convention to order and presiding over its action, in the
selection of the temporary chairman, is absolutely without proper evidence before
him of the right of those voting to take part in the proceedings of the convention.
S.. The danger of taking a vote viva voce under such circumstances is manifest,
as no opportunity is presented for an objection to the reception of a vote, and the
chairman, even presuming that he had personal knowledge with respect to the
authority of any of the delegates, would be utterly unable to determine in the unison
of voices whether all of those who participated were entitled to do so.
Id. at 309, 41 N.Y.S. at 1082. The current statute permits a vote viva voce where only one
candidate is nominated for the position. N.Y. ELac. LAw § 6-126(2) (McKinney 1978).
7 N.Y. ELtc. LAW § 6-126(3) (McKinney 1978).
Is See, e.g., Hobson v. Lomenzo, 30 App. Div. 2d 981, 293 N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d Dep't 1968);
Johnson v. Lomenzo, 28 App. Div. 2d 965, 966, 283 N.Y.S.2d 214, 216 (3d Dep't 1967), aff'd,
20 N.Y.2d 783, 230 N.E.2d 730, 284 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1967).
11 See Wager v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 59 App. Div. 2d 729, 398 N.Y.S.2d 551
(2d Dep't), affl'd, 42 N.Y.2d 1100, 369 N.E.2d 1192, 399 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1977). In Wager, the
Conservative Party of Suffolk County failed to file timely designating petitions for its dele-
gates to the Tenth Judicial District Nominating Convention. In an attempt to cure that
oversight, the party persuaded the Suffolk County Board of Elections to accept its state
executive director's designations by letter after the filing date and had its convention with
those delegates helping to create a quorum. A candidate of another party objected to the
nominations. The court held that all nominations at the convention were invalid, stating:
We find no authority, nor is there any supplied by the respondents, to convince
us that certification by the Suffolk County Board of Elections of the approved
nominees for delegates by the executive director of the New York State Conserva-
tive Party would be a valid alternative [to the statutory procedure] for acquiring
delegates .... The Conservative Party Judicial Convention for the Tenth Judicial
District consisted of only duly elected delegates from Nassau County. This is insuf-
ficient to constitute a quorum .... Without a quorum the action of the conven-
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There are virtually no other legislative requirements or restric-
tions on the conduct of the conventions. Indeed, several of the re-
strictions which the statute provides for other political nominating
conventions are expressly excluded for judicial nominating conven-
tions.1°° Most important of these is the requirement that the nomi-
nee be an enrolled member of the party. The legislature's waiver of
this requirement permits and has resulted in bipartisan endorse-
ment of judicial candidates in many elections, thereby rendering
their election a virtual fait accompli before the voters even enter the
voting booth."0 '
If one of the principal purposes of the convention system is to
preserve the party leaders' control over the nominating process, the
present judicial convention system certainly fulfills that purpose.
The overwhelming consensus of observers has been that the party
leaders dominate the selection of delegates to the nominating con-
ventions and, consequently, the conventions themselves."'2 A vari-
ety of reform proposals have been suggested to correct this situation
and convert the nominating stage into a positive element of the
judicial selection process.
The most far-reaching proposal of this type is to disband en-
tirely the judicial convention procedure. The foremost advocate of
tion is not effective. Consequently, the nomination of the five Conservative Party
candidates for the office of Justice of the Supreme Court for the Tenth Judicial
District are invalid.
59 App. Div. 2d at 730-31, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
114 See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-120(4) (McKinney 1978). Section 6-120(4) allows candi-
dates for judicial office an exception from the usual requirements that candidates be enrolled
members of the party on whose tickets they run.
"I! See, e.g., Wager, Required, But Not Permitted, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,1977, § 21 (L.I.),
at 24, col. 3; Rosenman, A Better Way to Select Judges, 48 JUDicATURE 86, 88 (1964). The
bipartisan endorsement is one of the most controversial aspects of judicial nominations. On
the one hand, it permits both parties to rally behind obviously superior candidates in order
to assure their election. This occurs particularly when candidates run for reelection. On the
other hand, it deprives the voters of any meaningful choice, thereby transferring the selection
process from the public to the party leaders who dominate the judicial conventions.
I" See note 154 infra. The Committee on State Courts of Superior Jurisdiction of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York recently concluded: "Under the present
system, delegates to the judicial conventions generally do as they are told by the political
leaders who select them, and therefore play no constructive role in the judicial selection
process." Committee on State Courts of Superior Jurisdiction, A Proposal to Restructure the
Judicial District Nominating Convention System, 32 Rlc. oF N.Y.C.B.A. 615 (1977). [here-
inafter cited as Committee Report]. A similar conclusion was reached in a recent news-
paper expose of the 1977 Democratic judicial convention in the Bronx, which is one of the
few areas where vying intra-party factors still actively battle over control of the convention.
The article indicated that the leaders control the selection of delegates and, through them,
the nomating process. Fowler, The 'Making' of Judges in New York, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10,
1977, at 1, col. 4.
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such reform was the Dominick Commission, which concluded in
1973:
This method of selecting nominees is subject to two major failings.
First, the method of allocating the number of delegates to the
convention from each county, the selection of these delegates and
indeed the very proceedings of the conventions are not well publi-
cized and therefore generally not visible to the electorate. Second,
since the number of delegates to the convention is geared to popu-
lation, the more populous counties have been able to control the
nominating convention and have tended to nominate supreme
court justices from the residents of these counties. . . . For these
reasons, the Commission recommends the abolition of the judicial
district convention. The Commission recognizes that partisan poli-
tics cannot be eliminated as a basis for judicial selection even if
the size of the electoral unit is reduced from the judicial district
to the county. The abolition of the district convention system will,
however, eliminate the almost invisible nature of the proceedings
and will permit the voters to become better informed of the pro-
ceedings.1 0
The principal difficulty with proposals calling for elimination
of the judicial conventions is their lack of support in the legisla-
ture. °' In addition, elimination alone will not suffice to effect the
desired improvement. If the conventions are to be eliminated, a
viable alternative nominating process must be enacted. While to do
that is possible, it appears to be more practical to propose reforms
to the convention process itself. For example, to simply replace the
conventions with nominating petitions and primaries could exacer-
bate some of the problems which already plague the election pro-
cess.
One proposal would be to create a merit selection committee
within each party for each of the conventions. The committee would
screen and propose a list of highly qualified candidates to the con-
vention, which would then be required to choose its candidates from
the list. This proposal would of course face the same potential prob-
lems as the mandatory preselection screening proposal and the pro-
posal for conversion to merit selection appointment of judges."'0 The
I N.Y. TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE N.Y. STATE CouRT SYSTEM (The Dominick Com-
mission), AND JusTc FOR ALL, Part 11, 55 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Dominick Commission
Report] quoted in Klein & Witztum, Judicial Administration 1972-1973, 1972-1973 AN~uAL
SURVEY OF AmmcA LAW 717, 718-19 (1973) (footnote omitted).
"1 Committee Report, supra note 102, at 617. No such proposal has even come close to
passage in the 5 years since the Dominick Commission proposed abolition of the judicial
nominating conventions.
'" See note 76-79 and accompanying text supra.
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legislature, however, will probably be no more receptive to it than
other merit selection plans that have been proposed in the past,
particularly if it is mandatory rather than merely voluntary.
A more practical alternative has been suggested by the Com-
mittee on State Courts of Superior Jurisdiction of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York."0 8 Its proposal would reduce the
number of delegates to one per assembly district to make conven-
tions "more deliberative" and would bar the delegates from holding
other political office."0 7 The Committee proposal would also provide
a term of office for delegates of at least two years to enable them to
develop a working relationship and possibly hold earlier conventions
and thus gain time to evaluate potential candidates.108 By also
equipping the conventions with screening facilities, a permanent
staff and adequate funding to compensate the delegates, the con-
ventions and their delegates could gain time and the resources to
give more attention to their duties. The most important aspect of
the Committee's proposal is the attempt to reduce the size of the
conventions.0 9 The Committee explained that "the smallness of the
conventions would permit actual deliberations, and might make it
more difficult for the delegates to vote automatically as they are
instructed by their district or county leaders."110 Another improve-
ment which reduction of the size of the conventions might effect
would be to give the proceedings greater visibility and encourage
more careful monitoring of the conventions by the media and con-
cerned civic organizations.1
"I Committee Report, note 102 supra, at 615. The Committee's proposal was pragmati-
cally inspired:
The Committee. . .has concluded that final enactment of merit appointment for
Supreme Court justices may be so distant in time that this interim improvement
in the judicial district convention system should be strongly advocated at this time.
Id. at 618.
I" Id. at 616.
'° Id. at 616-17.
'"Id. at 616.
110 Id. At present, the conventions often range in size from 40 to 200 members. Id. See
generally Wager v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 59 App. Div. 2d 729, 398 N.Y.S.2d 551
(2d Dep't), affl'd, 42 N.Y.2d 1100, 369 N.E.2d 1192,399 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1977), discussed in note
99 supra; Gilroy v. Lomenzo, 35 App. Div. 2d 746, 747, 314 N.Y.S.2d 607 (3d Dep't 1970);
Johnson v. Lomenzo, 28 App. Div. 2d 965, 966, 283 N.Y.S.2d 214 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d
783, 230 N.E.2d 729, 284 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1967). With no formal internal structure other than
delegation heads and chairmen, most observers deem them unwieldly and, therefore, neces-
sarily over dependent on the party leaders for direction. See, e.g., Fowler, The 'Making' of
Judges in New York, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1977, at 1, col. 4; Brokered Judgeships, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 8, 1975, at 30, col. 1.
HI See Dominick Commission Report, supra note 103, at 55, quoted in Klein & Witztum,
note 103 supra, at 718-19; Brokered Judgeships, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1975, at 30, col. 1.
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The Committee's proposal appears to offer a sensible and work-
able compromise reform. If combined with other reforms, such as
mandatory prenomination screening and a prohibition against bi-
partisan endorsements, the proposal could enhance significantly the
quality of judicial nominees.
C. Nonpartisan Election
The first question that generally comes to mind when one dis-
cusses the problem of political control over judicial elections is: why
not simply make the elections nonpartisan? If we do not allow the
political parties to play a role, and indeed do not even reveal the
candidates' party affiliations, would that not focus attention on the
candidates' relative qualifications? Although it is not easy to ex-
plain why, there is almost unanimity among informed commenta-
tors that nonpartisan election simply will not work and, in fact,
represents a step backward."' As discussed below, however, nonpar-
tisan election, coupled with other compromise reforms, can play a
constructive role in the reform effort.
A case in point may serve to demonstrate that nonpartisan
election, in and of itself, is not an acceptable alternative. In 1973 a
nonpartisan civic group called "Good Judges for Philadelphia"
mounted a campaign to fill thirty-nine judgeships on the Philadel-
phia Court of Common Pleas.113 Over 250 candidates were on the
ballot. Despite much publicity, only twenty per cent of the electo-
rate voted; only those "Good Judges" who had political party en-
dorsement were elected.' The "Good Judges" incident demon-
strates two problems that have plagued the concept of nonpartisan
election since it was originally proposed one hundred years ago:
voter apathy and lack of voter knowledge about' the candidates."'
Other similar cases are not difficult to find. For example, in
1972 Florida shifted from 90 years of partisan election, dominated
by the Democratic party, to nonpartisan election."' Five years later
I See Berkson, A Merit Plan for Selecting Judges in Florida 7 (U. of Fla. Civic Info.
Series No. 55, 1975); Lilly, Some Thoughts for Judicial Reform in Oklahoma, 10 TuSA L.J.
91, 102 (1974); Utter, Selection and Retention-A Judge's Perspective, 48 WAsH. L. REV. 839,
844-45 (1973). But see Hunter, Some Thoughts About Judicial Reform, 19 DE PAUL L. REV.
457 (1970).
" Ballot for Judges Fazes Pennsylvania, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1973, at 29, col. 2.
"' Id. at col. 3.
I See Lilly, supra note 112, at 102; Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 293-94. See
generally Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections-Nonpartisan Premises with Partisan Results, 32
Omo ST. L.J. 762, 773-74 (1971).
I Karl, supra note 10, at 290.
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a commentator reviewed the results of the 1976 elections for the
Florida Supreme Court and concluded:
Though the non-partisan system did much to remove judicial elec-
tions from the control of any political party, it did little to improve
the turnout of voters, who are so often apathetic in judicial con-
tests . . . .[O]nly 21 percent of the electorate voted in the pri-
mary, and. . . only 18 per cent of the voters turned out for the
runoff.1 7
Significantly, the Florida study concluded that a primary reason for
this poor turnout was the public's lack of knowledge about the can-
didates."'
While voter ignorance is surely not the only cause of the voter
indifference in judicial elections, it is surely one of the primary
causes. In the highly charged and publicized 1974 campaign", for
judgeships on the New York Court of Appeals, over 4.6 million votes
were cast for each of the two seats involved, compared with 5.2
million cast in the gubernatorial election that same day. 2' Thus, it
is safe to say that, where the voters have been treated to some
knowledge about the candidates, they have shown themselves to be
more interested and more likely to take part in judicial elections.,2'
The "voter ignorance-indifference" syndrome has plagued non-
partisan elections for years. 2 Thus, the American Judicature So-
ciety has refused to sfipport it because offering the voters only a
name and an appearance breeds what the Society calls the
"dictatorship of irrelevancy."1 Studies in states where nonpartisan
M7 Id. at 291.
118 Id. at 291-92. The same conclusion has been reached in studies of partisan elections.
See, e.g., Beechem, Can Judicial Elections Express the People's Choice?, 57 JUDICATURE 242
(1974); Klots, How Much Do Voters Know or Care About Judicial Candidates?, 38 JUDIcATURE
141 (1955); McKnight, Schaefer & Johnson, Choosing Judges: Do the Voters Know What
They're Doing?, 62 JUDICATURE 94 (1978); Van Osdal, Politics and Judicial Selection, 28 ALA.
LAw. 167, 168-70 (1967).
"' For example, some of the campaign advertising featured candidates for judgeships
closing jail doors and making other promises about toughness on crime. The same type of
tactics were employed in the 1972 election between Judge Charles Breitel and Jacob D.
Fuchsberg for chief judge of the court of appeals. After that election, the Institute of Judicial
Administration concluded that "the Breitel-Fuchsberg contest raised significantly voter con-
sciousness of the importance of chief judge." Quoted in Goldstein, Voters to Decide on
Appointment of Judges, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1977, § B, at 3, col. 3.
12 C. PnuL, P. NFim.51 & A. PREss, WHE Do JuDGEs ComE FROM? 119-20 (Inst. of
Jud. Ad. 1976).
121 See note 120 supra.
"2 See Note, Judicial Selection and Tenure-the Merit Plan in Ohio, 42 U. CiN. L. REv.
255, 265-67 [hereinafter cited as Merit in Ohio]; cf. Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 292-
95 (partisan and nonpartisan judicial elections plagued by lack of voter knowledge).
1'2 The Dictatorship of Irrelevancy, 48 JUDICATURE 124 (1964).
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election has been in effect for several years show that, if voters
participate in such judicial elections at all, they tend to be influ-
enced by the ballot position or name of the candidate and, paradoxi-
cally, party affiliation.121
In light of these criticisms, it is not surprising that nonpartisan
election is regarded so poorly by judicial election scholarsI2s These
failings of nonpartisan election as a reform do not necessarily mean
that there is no place for it in our judicial selection system.'26 If
assisted by, or implemented as a corollary to, other reforms, nonpar-
" In Ohio, one detailed review of the nonpartisan election system concluded:
The non-partisan elective method forces the voter to choose among judicial
candidates on the basis of the politics of irrelevancy. Without the ambition or the
ability to obtain enough information to make a meaningful choice, the voter often
responds in his dilemma by seizing upon any circumstance, irrelevant though it
may be, in an attempt to make his vote not totally meaningless. Thus, a candidate's
prime qualification may be a familiar name, a proper place on the ballot, or the
equally irrelevant factor of political party affiliation, even though the ballot is non-
partisan.
Merit in Ohio, supra note 122, at 267 (citations omitted).
Another commentator, in discussing the failings of nonpartisan election, has concluded:
[The] evidence suggests that where the nonpartisan method is utilized, a
candidate's character, legal ability, experience, and judicial temperament are of
little importance. The public is simply unknowledgeable about these factors. On
the other hand, the size of a candidate's campaign chest, his television image, or
his position on the ballot are particularly crucial. Large sums of money purchase
needed exposure and thus enable the physically attractive candidate to gain popu-
lar support. Further, political science research suggests that a candidate benefits
if his family name is widely recognized and if his name is placed at the top of the
ballot.
Berkson, supra note 112, at 7.
Although the election is supposed to be nonpartisan, most candidates are nominated
through partisan political activities, and the political parties continue to campaign for candi-
dates of their choice and circulate lists of the nominees and their party affiliations. See e.g.,
Merit in Ohio, supra note 122, at 268; Barber, supra note 115, at 766. See also S. Escovrrz,
JUnDICL SELECTON AND TENuRE 7 (Am. Jud. Soc'y 1975).
125 Interestingly, early critics of nonpartisan election argued that its principal drawback
is its elimination of the parties' selection process. For example, former President and Chief
Justice William H. Taft criticized nonpartisan judicial elections in a speech before the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1913 because it "permitted unqualified persons who could not even
muster political support to get elected to the bench through vigorous campaigns." Taft, The
Selection and Tenure of Judges, 38 A.B.A. REP. 418 (1913). Cf. Harding, The Case for Parti-
san Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A.J. 1162 (1969) (partisan election of judges promotes the
expression of the will of the electorate in judicial policy decisions). See also Escovitz, supra
note 124, at 8.
"I8 Another weakness of nonpartisan elections is the lack of control over the size of the
ballot. Vote splitting can be so great that the results fail to represent actual voter sympathies.
To draft arbitrary size limitations or other ballot restrictions to cure this problem may raise
serious federal and state constitutional problems, unless such restrictions are specifically
linked to improving the quality of the bench. See, e.g., Curtiss, Screening Judicial Candidates
for Election, 59 JUDICATURE 320 (1976).
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tisan election can play- a constructive role in our reform efforts. For
example, it is worth exploring the use of nonpartisan election coup-
led with either mandatory screening or public campaign financing.
The gains that may be achieved by taking politics out of the judicial
selection process as much as possible make it worth while to study
and explore further such possible hybrid proposals which include
nonpartisan election as one of their elements.
D. Local Option
One compromise which has received considerable attention in
recent years is the so-called "local option." Under this proposal, the
issue whether supreme court and local judges should be appointed
or elected would be submitted to the voters of different areas in the
state by a series of local referenda.2 7 The principal proponent of this
compromise, the late Senator Gordon, was of the view that people
in different areas of the state have different views regarding the
proper method of selecting their judges, and that any across-the-
board judicial reform proposal would not succeed in the state legis-
lature." 8 Senator Gordon's views cannot be disregarded lightly. As
Chairman of the Joint Task Force on Court Reorganization and the
Senate Judiciary Committee, he spent several years holding and
attending hearings all over the State upon virtually every conceiva-
ble judicial selection proposal raised in recent years."9
Underlying the local option proposal is the assumption that the
stimulus and need for the merit plan varies from one locality to the
next. Senator Gordon observed that the loudest proponents of merit
selection werefrom New York City and, to a lesser extent, Buffalo.
His own experience in Westchester and the predominance of views
from other nonurban areas appeared to indicate a strong preference
for and confidence in the elective system.11 The judicial system, it
' See Gordon, Judicial Reform: A Legislative Viewpoint, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 284, 286
(1976).
In Senator Gordon wrote:
The problems encountered with the proposal in the Legislature to appoint
judges to the Court of Appeals, the reaction of the voters to the state-wide court
administration-finance amendment in the 1975 election and the apparent wide-
spread opposition to an all-appointive system according to the Gannett poll, fore-
warn us that any effort to bring about an across-the-board system for appointing
all judges in the state without any expression of choice by the voters will face
impossible odds.
Id.
In See, e.g., Gordon Panel Sets Albany Hearing on Judicial Selection "Option" Plan,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
I" See, e.g., Albany Hearing, supra note 129, wherein it is stated: "[Senator Gordon]
has pointed out that while appointment of judges on merit standards has strong support in
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is reasoned, not only can but should take cognizance of and accom-
modate these differences throughout the state. 3 '
Local option is not, however, without its critics and its own
inherent defects or problems. Former Chief Judge Breitel, for exam-
ple, has criticized the proposal on the ground that it will foster
fractionalism and undermine the type of unanimity required of the
courts on a statewide basis. 82 Moreover, critics ask: which local
units should be permitted to select their own mode of selection?
Should it be on a county basis, a judicial district basis or some other
basis? If done on either a county or district basis, what happens
where portions of one county fall within two or more different judi-
cial districtslrs Does it make a difference that appellate division
justices will be selected from among the ranks of appointed and
elected judges? Who should fund the costs of a local merit selection
system?
None of these questions appears to present an insurmountable
barrier to adoption of the local option. How judges are selected need
not affect their decisions or the unanimity of decisions by the su-
preme court. If appellate division justices are all selected in the
same way, it should make little difference how they reached the trial
courts. Indeed, since, under the current system, the majority of
judges are appointed to fill vacancies or new posts, appellate divi-
sion justices are already drawn from "mixed ranks." Moreover, the
costs of financing the system can be handled in a manner similar
to the way that the costs of elections and local court administration
are currently handled.
The local option proposal has much surface appeal. If a particu-
downstate areas, particularly in New York City, the continuation of the elective procedure
has equally strong backing in upstate areas." Id. at 3, col. 4.
"I See Gordon, supra note 127. A number of states, including Missouri, Kansas, Indiana
and Arizona, have adopted local option systems. Id. at 286.
"I See Breitel, The New Judicial Amendment, VESEY STRFr LgrraR, at 3, col. 1 (N.Y.
County Lawyers Ass'n Nov. 1976); accord, Remarks of Gov. Hugh L. Carey, N.Y County
Lawyers Association Annual Dinner, reprinted in VEsEY STnEr LEITER, at 3, col. 1 (N.Y.
County Lawyers Ass'n Jan. 1978).
"' Where a county is split between judicial districts one obvious answer is to vote on the
options on the basis of judicial, assembly, or election districts. This solution, however, may
involve inequities of its own which should be carefully considered. Gerrymandering has re-
sulted in several strangely drawn election and assembly districts, with small pieces of some
localities tacked on to other areas. Thus, much of the electorate may be disenfranchised on
this important communtiy issue if the voting is done on such a basis. On the other hand,
voting by judicial district may not, in some localities, accurately reflect local sentiment, due
to the size of the districts. Additionally, much of local government, including the executive,
and in many areas the county legislature, is organized by county. Thus, voting on this local
issue on any basis other than by county may give the local judiciary an undesirably anoma-
lous character when compared with other arms of local government.
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lar community wants a particular system, why not allow it to so
elect? Moreover, since the trial courts serve a local area, it seems
logical to make them particularly responsive to local wishes. Thus,
except for a possible philosophical aversion to having a mixture of
selection systems rather than a unified system, the local option
proposal appears worthy of continued consideration.
E. Public Sponsorship of Judicial Campaigns
Two recurrent drawbacks of judicial election campaigns are the
often staggering costs and the difficulty that the candidates face in
attempting to establish a campaign identity.13' Broadening the
nominating process to provide for more primary contests will ob-
viously escalate the costs. The difficulty of developing a public
identity results not only from this cost, but also from the restrictions
placed upon the things judicial candidates are permitted to say in
their campaign speeches and literature.' Campaign statements
must be so bland that it is impossible to generate significant media
interest. The result has been that voters learn very little about the
candidates and thus are discouraged from taking an active role in
judicial elections. 3'
One way that has been suggested to deal with the financial
aspect of the problem is to have the state finance and oversee judi-
cial campaigns. A nonpartisan, state-funded judicial elections com-
mission could be established which would print and circulate appro-
priate campaign literature and even help finance responsible cam-
paign advertising in the public media. By providing tax or other
financial incentives for coverage of judicial elections, the state
might also stimulate newspapers and broadcast media to cover the
114 See, e.g., Karl, Electing Supreme Court Justices-For the Last Time, 60 JUMDATUR
290, 291 (1977); McCloy, In Favor of Amendments to Reform Courts, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1977,
at 1, col. 1.
' See notes 147-52 and accompanying text infra. As noted by one commentator:
Tihe advantages which the public has been led to expect from judicial election-
eering are greatly restricted by the ethical regulations of both the bar and the
courts. Indeed, unless a candidate had been guilty of some gross professional or
judicial abuse, there are very few issues which may be openly aired for the benefit
of the voting public. Judicial campaigns are therefore principally ceremonial with
minimal give and take between prospective judges and their electorate.
Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 290-91.
119 This problem is readily apparent to the candidates themselves and is by no means
limited to New York. In a revealing and candid article, one judge of the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court, while campaigning for that state's equivalent of New York's appellate division,
found that many people "did not know there was a Superior Court, and of those who did
know, many thought it was a trial court." Spaeth, Reflections on a Judicial Campaign, 60
JUDICATURE 10, 11 (1976).
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elections. Public funding for these campaigns could also enable the
state to impose reasonable ceilings on campaign spending to prevent
candidates from "buying" elections. '
Another type of public campaign funding plan was adopted by
the Dade County Bar Association of Florida in the 1970's.rs Under
that plan, a "judicial trust fund" was established, made up of con-
tributions from lawyers in Dade County. The lawyers were asked
further to pledge that they would not make any other campaign
contributions. Candidates who were found "qualified" by a screen-
ing panel and who pledged not to accept other contributions from
lawyers received pro rata distributions from the fund for use in their
campaigns for election or retention election, the largest amounts
going to judges running in contested elections. The balance of the
fund was used to print and publicize the biographical and back-
ground information on the candidates. 3 '
The Dade County plan proved to be a success and met with
public and bar approval. Some criticized it, however, for not ad-
dressing the real problem, i.e., the method of selection. 10 Others
complained that it deprived lawyers of their right to support indi-
vidual candidates and even compelled them indirectly to support
candidates whom they might disfavor."' But, in general, the plan
appears to have been greeted as a novel and constructive method
for easing some of the principal drawbacks of privately financed
campaigns. The plan's virtues and potential virtues can be summa-
rized as follows: It helped remove the necessity for the candidate to
' In the 1973 campaign for chief judge of the court of appeals, Jacob Fuchsberg report-
edly spent between $700,000 and $800,000 and Charles Breitel almost $500,000. C. PHmn,
P. Nzjisum & A. PREss, Wtman Do JUDGEs Cois FROM? ii, 85-86 (Inst. of Jud. Ad. 1976).
This problem is not limited to New York. Another recent study indicated that candidates
for trial judgeships in Los Angeles spend in excess of $50,000 on their election campaigns.
Beechem, Can Judicial Elections Express the People's Choice?, 57 JuDIcATURE 242, 245
(1974). See also A Need for Change, supra note 6, at 618-19 n.70.
,s See White, New Approach to Financing Judicial Campaigns, 59 A.B.A.J. 1429 (1973).
I" The attempt to educate the voters is the most important aspect of the proposal for
public sponsorship of judicial campaigns. The public's lack of knowledge about judicial
candidates is the most emphasized and indisputable flaw in the elective system. See note 118
supra.
"I White, supra note 138, at 1430. The President of the ABA, however, has praised the
plan:
While it is regrettable that the tremendous expense of judicial campaigns necessi-
tates outside campaign contributions, your proposal seems to me the most practical
way of control which I have yet seen proposed. Additionally, it conforms to the
highest ethical procedures for both sitting judges and judicial candidates, and it is
fully in accord with the proposed new code of judicial conduct. ...
Id.
141 Id.
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solicit contributions from those who might appear before him or her
in the courtroom. It also removed the pressure that many lawyers
felt to contribute to the campaigns of certain judges out of fear of
reprisal. In addition, the plan appeared likely to encourage more
candidates to offer themselves for office.
The Dade plan's principal drawbacks appear to be its limited
scope and voluntary nature."2 A broader fund, not limited to law-
yers' contributions and not circumventable by the candidates'
merely declining to participate, appears desirable. More confidence
in the plan might also be generated by not limiting it to contribu-
tions from attorneys; that would also remove the potential stigma
that it is "bar-controlled."
The cost of judicial campaigns, of course, varies with the elec-
tion."I Where a candidate has bipartisan endorsement or is running
as the party candidate in a "safe district," very little expense is
incurred. In such a situation, virtually no campaigning even takes
place. Contested elections, however, may cost the campaigners tens
or hundreds of thousands of dollars.'" Whether the accurate cost
estimate for trial level campaigns is $50,000 or $200,000, it is clear
that such expenses seriously tax a candidate's resources and inhibits
the ability or desire of many to run. If the candidate turns to the
party for this financing, the result is to "cast a shadow upon the
dignity of the judiciary." ' Public financing of judicial campaigns
could help remove this deterrent to active judicial campaigns. The
specter of judges being saddled with monetary and nonmonetary
campaign debts would be lifted. Adequate funding for more detailed
142 While it would appear that such a proposal could be made compulsory for the candi-
dates, it is questionable whether the legislature can compel all members of the Bar to contrib-
ute to a single judicial election fund and to that fund only.
14 Another difficulty with privately financed judicial campaigns is the continuing finan-
cial burden they often create for the judge, both in terms of campaign deficits and reelection
expenses. Most of the normal political methods for paying off such deficits, such as post-
election fund raisers, are not available for judges. Judicial candidates are prohibited to know
the names of those who contribute to their campaign, since the contributors may appear
before them in court. Mrs. Lambert Draws Criticism Over Fund-Raising Party for Her, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 5, 1977, at 41, col. 3.
" See notes 134 and 137 supra. The ramifications of the high cost of campaign for
judicial office was aptly summarized by one commentator:
When a judge must pay one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in campaign expen-
ses to obtain a judicial post which pays a salary of thirty-five to fifty thousand
dollars a year, we are obviously saying that no one shall be allowed to be a judge
unless he is a rich man; or else we are saying that judges must indebt and obligate
themselves to persons to whom they will owe fulfillment of obligations after they
attain the bench.
Bergstrom, The Struggle for Judicial Reform, 66 ILL. B.J. 22, 25 (1977).
M' A Need for Change, supra note 6, at 619.
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and better publicized debate could also be assured.14 1
Effective campaign debate in judicial elections requires more
than money however. Methods must be found to stimulate media
and public interest in the candidates and their positions. Foremost
in this regard is to remove some of the restrictions on responsible
but lively campaign debate. At present, judicial candidates are pro-
hibited from discussing many of the legal issues which are of partic-
ular interest to the public."7 As former New York supreme court
Justice Eli Wager recently commented:
Judicial campaigns are farcical in that, unlike campaigns for
political office, they seem to be designed to keep the public unin-
formed about the candidates and the issues. The Canons of Judi-
cial Ethics prevent candidates for judicial office from discussing
their opponents'. qualifications, reputations for legal experience
and proficiency or, indeed, anything other than the candidate him-
self, his own background and experience.1m
Similar "ethical" restrictions virtually prohibit judicial candi-
dates from even discussing the issues. For example, a rules booklet
prepared by the Bar Association of Greater Cleveland, entitled
"Campaigning For Judicial Office," warns judicial candidates:
A candidate for judicial office also should not make or suffer
others to make for him, promises of conduct in office which appeal
to the cupidity or prejudices of the appointing or electing power;
he should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on dis-
puted issues to secure class support, and he should do nothing
while a candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will
administer his office with bias, partiality, or improper discrimina-
tion. Thus, although he may campaign in his own behalf, a candi-
date must not make pledges or promises of conduct in office, other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office .... 49
"' See notes 137-39 and accompanying text supra.
'7 See notes 148-49 and accompanying text infra.
" Wager, Required, But Not Permitted, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1977, § 21 (L.I.) at 24,
col. 3. Local bar association rules for judicial campaigns and the Code of Judicial Conduct
also prohibit judicial candidates from actively supporting any other candidates for judicial
office. Canon 30 of the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides:
[11f a judge becomes a candidate for any judicial office, he should refrain from all
conduct which might tend to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is using the power
or prestige of his judicial position to promote his candidacy or the success of his
party.
ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 30 (1958).
"I Campaigning For Judicial Office (Bar Ass'n of Gr. Cleveland 1973), reprinted in T.
LOWE, RESOURCE MATERIALs FOR NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE
82, 91 (Am. Judicial Soc'y 1974) (citations omitted). The Cleveland Bar Association's rule
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Such campaign restrictions create a serious philosophical di-
lemma regarding judicial campaigns. On the one hand, they pre-
serve the dignity of judicial office and prevent against scare cam-
paigns on isolated or emotional issues. 15 In the words of Judge
Richard Bartlett, former New York State Court Administrator, the
candidates "are running for the job of professional neutral."'' On
the other hand, these prohibitions virtually strip the election cam-
paign of its meaning. If a principal purpose of electing judges is to
make them accountable to the people,5 2 the people should know
what the candidates stand for. It can be argued that the public has
a right to know, for example, if a potential judge believes in strict
prison sentences or the death penalty and what his views are on
other issues of public concern.
It should be possible to accomodate both of these competing
views by permitting the candidates to release unemotional state-
ments about their positions on the issues, but prohibiting them from
making statements about other candidates or about pending cases,
from debating with each other about the issues, and from making
campaign promises. Additional protection against irresponsible
statements may be provided by requiring that the statements first
is derived from Canon 7(B)(1) of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct which provides:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge for a judicial office: (a) should maintain
the dignity appropriate to judicial office; (b) should prohibit public officials, ap-
pointees or employees subject to his direction or control from soliciting or accepting
campaign fund contributions for him; (c) should not make pledges or promises of
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of
the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent
his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr, Canon 7(B)(1) (1973), reprinted in LowE, supra note 149,
at 101.
,1' Restrictions placed on what the candidates can say also serve to downplay the politi-
cal atmosphere that otherwise might pervade the election process. See, e.g., Seiler, Judicial
Selection in New Jersey, 5 SEToN HALL L. Rhv. 721 (1974), wherein the author concluded:
The issue, therefore, is not whether judicial selection can be removed from politics.
Because courts form an important link in the network of governmental power, their
chief officers do fulfill a political role. Rather, the issue is how the public's interest
in obtaining the most competent, disinterested, and independent judges can be best
protected.
Id. at 725.
Ms, Quoted in Goldstein, Voters to Decide on Appointment of Judges, N.Y. Times, Oct.
20, 1977, § B, at 3, col. 3.
112 It is thus sometimes argued that the prime consideration that led "reformers" in the
Jacksonian era to call for the direct election rather than appointment of judges was their
belief that "elected judges were more likely to adjudicate disputes according to the popular
will and opinion of the people." Hunter, Some Thoughts About Judicial Reform, 19 DE PAUL
L. REv. 457, 459 (1970). See generally Hays, Selection of Judges in Oklahoma, 2 TULSA L.
REV. 127, 127-28 (1965); Niles, The Popular Election of Judges in Historical Perspective, 21
REc. OF N.Y.C.B.A. 523 (1969).
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be submitted to and approved by the local bar association, judicial
disciplinary body or screening committee, provided that unreason-
able censorship is not exercised by them.
F. Stimulation of Bipartisan Representation
One of the most common criticisms of the current mode of
election is the prevalence of cross-endorsement of the candidates by
the major and even minor parties.1' The result is that there often
are not even enough names on the ballot for voters to make a choice.
Political leaders themselves have criticized this practice of "trade-
offs of court seats" among the parties.5 '
While no one has ever isolated the factors that govern how the
party leaders choose which persons they will back, several partici-
pants in the process have identified at least some of them: party
service, "retirement" from other political positions and party con-
tributions.' Complicating the problem further is the current elec-
tion law, which makes it virtually impossible for candidates to run
as independents or challenge the major party choices in the primar-
ies.' Since one may become a candidate only if nominated at a
judicial nominating convention, as a practical matter, one must
have a party first and can only be nominated through the mecha-
nism of a party convention. 57 This fact has caused some persons to
question the constitutionality of the nominating process itself, since
it may unjustifiably restrict ballot eligibility by preventing candi-
10 The late Samuel Rosenman, himself an elected New York supreme court justice,
frequently criticized the current system of judicial selection in New York on the grounds that
"even in doubtful districts, interparty political deals often deprive the voters of any real
choice." Rosenman, A Better Way to Select Judges, 48 JUiCATURE 86, 88 (1964); accord,
Parsons, The Selection and Tenure of Florida Supreme Court Justices, 9 Mumn L.Q. 271, 276
(1955); Remarks of Former New York City Mayor John V. Lindsay, quoted in Lindsay
Charges "Machine" Rule of State Bench, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1972, at 1, col. 8. Similarly,
one former supreme court justice has written:
The outcome of probably 95 percent of judicial elections is predetermined by politi-
cal party leaders, cross-endorsement of major parties and acquisition of minor-
party endorsements, by whatever means and for whatever consideration they are
given. The public's real choices are pitifully few.
Wager, Required, but Not Permitted, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1977, § 21 (L.I.) at 24, col. 3.
15 Lindsay Charges "Machine" Rule of State Bench, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1972, at 1,
col. 8.
"I See M. TOLCHiN & S. TOLCEiN, To THE VICTOR. . . POLITICAL PATRONAGE FROM THE
CLUBHOUSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE, at 146-47 (1971); Clines, The Elusive Issue: Judgeships for
Sale?, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1970, at 20, col. 3.
11 Wager, supra note 153, at 24.
15, See N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 6-124 (McKinney 1978). See also Wager v. New York State Bd.
of Elections, 59 App. Div. 2d 729, 398 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't), affl'd, 42 N.Y.2d 1100, 369
N.E.2d 1192, 399 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1977), discussed in note 99 supra.
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dacy without providing for improvement of the quality of the
bench. 5' But nothing has come of that constitutional challenge to
this facet of the nominating process; the convention system remains
intact.
The cross-endorsement problem is neither new or confined to
New York. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration reached a similar conclusion in 1967. In its report,
"The Courts," it found that throughout the country judges were
being selected by an "intricate bargaining process" among political
leaders. 5 ' Indeed, so much criticism of this practice has been writ-
ten and aired that it is difficult to understand why it has not been
curbed.
It is suggested that the easiest and probably best way to elimi-
nate this problem is to simply outlaw it via legislation. Like all
simplistic solutions, this might also work some negative results. In
particular, such legislation could deprive us of the ability to assure
election or reelection of many undoubtedly able and superior jurists.
This does not mean, however, that the drawbacks of such legislation
outweigh its benefits, particularly if combined with other corollary
reforms. For example, if a procedure allowing independent candi-
dates to run is also adopted, the problem of "uncontested" elections
may be minimized. If independent screening is coupled with the
removal of cross-endorsements, superior candidates for election
should be readily recognized as such by the public.
Another potential reform which has been suggested would be to
mandate that the bench in each judicial district be bipartisan or
multipartisan by setting a minimum quota for each political
party.60 The legislature might require that members of each major
political party occupy at least one-third of the judgeships, leaving
one-third for contest between them, minor parties and indepen-
dents. Such a quota system might bring balance and create a struc-
ture of internal checks on the court. A quota system, however, might
1 3 See, e.g., Wager, supra note 153. See also Jardine, Ballot Access Rights: The Constitu-
tional Status of the Right to Run for Office, 1974 UTAH L. Rav. 290,332 (1974); Developments
in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111 (1975).
I"' PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTIcE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE CoumRS 67 (1967).
"I Studies of appointment under the merit system and the federal system indicate that
merely switching to them will not achieve a bipartisan or multipartisan result. Under either
system, the vast majority of those appointed to the bench come from the same political party
as the appointing executive. See, e.g., Goldman, A Profile of Carter's Judicial Nominees, 62
JUDIcATURE 246, 248, 251 (1978); Roberts, Twenty-Five Years Under the Missouri Plan, 3 GA.
ST. B.J. 185, 192 (1966).
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also over emphasize politics in the judiciary.'6 ' The constitutionality
of a system which favors only two of the political parties would also
be suspect, since it would arbitrarily restrict the voters' choice of
candidates.' 2 Thus, even a quota system would not guarantee that
the quality of the bench will improve.
G. Retention Review and Election
Even the most optimistic reformer will concede that no reform
proposal is foolproof. None can assure that all judges selected will
be worthy of the post or that they will perform at the desired level
of competence. For this reason, we cannot ignore the need for having
checks upon sitting justices and judges and a fair procedure for the
thoughtful review of the performance of the courts.'63 Regardless of
the method of selection, careful and diligent disciplinary efforts
should be maintained, both to assure that the judges know they will
be held responsible for their behavior and to enhance public confid-
ence in the judicial system itself.
The State Commission on Judicial Conduct, formally estab-
lished in 1976 as a result of a 1975 constitutional amendment,'64 has
,"I New York County Supreme Court Justice James Leff explained the political aspects
of judicial elections in a confidential report he delivered to State Administrative Judge
Richard Bartlett in 1974. The Village Voice obtained a copy of the report which read:
Of the nominations to be made in 1968, the New York Times observed, in an
editorial: "The biggest judicial pie in almost half a century is about to be cut...
there are strong indications that the pie will be mainly one flavor-plum.
(The terms in which the discussions on allocation were conducted were, accord-
ing to reports and gossip, "Albano gets two, Fino gets one for himself, Lindsay has
so many, Alex Rose gets one, etc." The implications clearly were that the designa-
tions were personal and would be made by an individual who had arrogated the
right to choose for himself without any statutory or constitutional basis on which
to legitimize the selection.)
I never learned the specifics that ordained who the 16 first-time nominees,
other than me, were to be. As to my own selection, I had, in 1962, become counsel
to the Conservative Party, and indulging in the fiction that "recognition" in allot-
ting judgeships would be accorded to the Liberal and Conservative Parties, one
Supreme Court Judgeship was committed to the Conservatives and by them to me.
Village Voice, Aug. 22, 1974, at 12, cols. 4-5.
"I See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
10 As two leading commentators recently wrote:
Tihe Founding Fathers also realized that, no matter what system of selection
they devised, not every judge would meet the high standards associated with judi-
cial office. Even highly qualified individuals might become involved in illegal activ-
ity and thus bring the office into disrepute.
Berkson & Tesitor, Holding Federal Judges Accountable, 61 JUDIcATUR 442, 443 (1978). See
Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, Judicial Removal in New York: A New Look, 40 FoRDHAm
L. REv. 1 (1971).
" N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22. For a discussion of judicial disciplinary procedures in
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the potential to achieve many of the desired results."5 Since its
jurisdiction is restricted to cases of misconduct, '66 however, it can
be only a partial check on the performance of judges, and is thus
only a partial solution to the retention issue. ' The New York State
constitution also provides possible removal by concurrent resolution
of two-thirds of both houses of the legislature;'6 8 but these checks
deal only with cases of serious misconduct.
There is need for a corollary check against judicial incompet-
ence, and even mediocrity, as well as lesser malfeasance and indig-
nities which will not gain the Commission's attention. Many re-
formers believe that this check can be provided by a form of reten-
tion review after a judge has actually served on the bench for a
stated period.'69
The most common retention review proposal is to require a
New York prior to the 1977 Constitutional Amendment, see Frankel, Judicial Discipline &
Removal, 44 TEx. L. REv. 1117, 1125-27 (1966).
"I The Commission still does not have a formal administrator. Gerald Stem has acted
as the administrator, by merely continuing his prior duties as executive director of the former
temporary commission. See Commission on Judicial Conduct Filled by New Appointments,
N.Y.L.J., April 14, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
'" N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 22(a) provides: "The commission ...shall receive [and]
investigate. . . complaints with respect to the conduct, qualifications, fitness to perform or
performance of official duties of any judge or justice. . . ." The same subsection provides
that the commission "may determine that a judge or justice be. . .censured, . . . removed
.. or retired. . . ... The Commission considers its jurisdiction "limited to judicial miscon-
duct." See [1978] ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEw YORK STATE COMMISSIoN ON JUDicLl CoNDucr
4, 8 [hereinafter cited as JUDIcIAL REPORT].
"7 In 1978 the Commission reported that during the first 16 months of its operations, 30
judges resigned while under investigation or after the initiation of removal proceedings by the
Commission. During the 2 years prior thereto, when the Temporary State Commission on
Judicial Conduct was in operation, 35 judges had resigned under such circumstances. JUDICIAL
REPORT, supra note 166, at 11. The Commission's position on this situation is as follows:
Since the Commission's jurisdiction is limited to incumbent judges, its inquir-
ies are terminated when a judge under investigation resigns from office. If the
alleged misconduct in such an instance falls properly within the jurisdiction of
another agency, such as a district attorney's office, the Commission will communi-
cate its recommendation that the matter be pursued. Often, however, in the ab-
sence of criminal conduct, the Commission concludes that the voluntary with-
drawal from office is sufficient, since such an act is nearly tantamount to the
severest remedy the Commission itself can pursue, which is involuntary removal
from office.
Id. at 11-12.
U N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 23(c). Section 23(c) provides:
No judge or justice shall be removed by virtue of this section except for
cause, which shall be entered on the journals, nor unless he shall have been served
with a statement of the cause alleged, and shall have had an opportunity to be
heard. On the question of removal, the yeas and nays shall be entered on the
journal.
Id.
M See, e.g., Reath, Judicial Evaluation-The Counterpart to Merit Selection, 60
A.B.A.J. 1246 (1974).
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sitting judge to simply stand for public reelection or retention elec-
tion shortly after ascending to the bench.70 It is generally suggested
that such retention election be nonpartisan and unopposed. The
voters would simply vote "yes" or "no" to the question whether
Judge X should be retained on the court. The election would be held
approximately 2 or 3 years after the judge ascends to the bench and,
thus, would presumably allow for a review of the judge's record.' 71
The retention election proposal stems from and is an integral
part of the so-called "merit plan" of appointment of judges.72 As
proposed by the American Judicature Society and sponsored by the
American Bar Association, the merit plan provides for gubernatorial
appointment of judges from a list of highly qualified candidates
proposed by a nonpartisan nominating commission. Two years after
appointment, the judge stands for retention election to give the
public an opportunity to approve or disapprove of his selection
based upon the judge's initial performance on the bench. 7 1 Only
about half of the states which have adopted a merit selection plan
have adopted the retention facet of the plan. 74 Interestingly, some
states which have thus far declined to adopt merit selection, have
adopted retention election.' Those states which have adopted
merit selection plans have adopted a wide variety of retention re-
view techniques, such as post-selection review by the nominating
committee or approval by the legislature, instead of retention
election. 7 1
-7' See S. Escovrrz, JUDICIAL SLECTION AND TEUE 43-47 (Am. Jud. Soc'y 1975). In
its theoretical form, the merit plan includes such a special uncontested retention election, to
take place approximately one or two years after the judges ascend the bench. See, e.g., A.
AsHmAN & J. ALnm, Tim Kzy To JUDICIAL MERIT SzLErmoN: THE NOMNATING PROCFss 11
(Am. Judicial Soc'y 1974); Alfini, The Judicial Selection Puzzle, 12 TRIAL 9 (1976); Winters,
A Better Way to Select Our Judges, 34 JUDICATURE 166, 167 (1951).
I In several states where retention election is utilized, the state bar associations regu-
larly study and evaluate the judge's performance. See, e.g., Reath, supra note 169 at 1246-
47; Sheldon, Searching for Judges in Oregon: Where Would the Bar Look for Help?, 61
JUDICATURE 376, 381 (1978). But see note 182 infra.
In See note 170 supra. See generally Nelson, Variations on a Theme-Selection and
Tenure of Judges, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 4 (1962).
113 The original text of the plan is published in 7 BULL. Am. JUDICIAL Soc'y 61, 84 (1914).
See also Text of the Model State Judicial Article, 47 JUDICATURE 8 (1963); Kales, Methods of
Selecting and Retiring Judges, 3 JUDICATURE 165, 171-75 (1920).
174 See S. Escovrrz, supra note 170, at 17-42; Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at
321-53.
17, S. Escovrrz, supra note 170, at 23; see note 174 supra.
116 See note 174 supra. In New York, judges can be removed by vote of two-thirds of the
Legislature on recommendation of the Governor. N.Y. CONsr. art. V1, § 23. The fact that few
people even know of the existence of this review procedure, and the history of its non-use
perhaps best attests to its effectiveness. It is not surprising that this remedy is infrequently
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The retention election procedure, while expensive, is relatively
easy to put into effect, being somewhat analogous to the referendum
held upon proper filing of a recall petition. Here, however, the elec-
tion would be automatic. Indeed, one variant of the retention elec-
tion proposal would be simply to provide for possible recall election
upon petition by the public. Such a procedure would spare the
expense and other burdens of an election except where necessary.
The principal criticism of recall is that, while still affording a
prompt public voice on the newly selected jurists, the procedure is
difficult and can become sidetracked on emotional issues."
Virtually all of the retention/review proposals are questioned
and criticized on the ground that they may adversely effect the
judge's independence and influence his decisions in critical and
controversial cases.1 18 Unfavorable results in a retention election,
like recall, might be likely to result from unpopular decisions. Even
more important, since the judges might hesitate to render unpopu-
lar but legally proper decisions for fear of recall, there is a danger
that we will be deprived of the important "checks and balances"
which the framers of the Constitution envisioned in creating a sepa-
rate and independent judiciary. 17  The threat of such a recall or
removal, and the public embarassment associated with it, might
also discourage potentially able jurists from agreeing to run for
judgeships.8
invoked, however, since legislative impeachment or recall is extreme, cumbersome, and po-
tentially political in nature.
' Retention review systems appear to have led to very few removals; and that is un-
doubtedly proper. The question, however, is whether it is used enough. See, e.g., PRESmENT's
COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
CoURTS, 69-70 (1967).
In England, judicial officers hold office during good behavior subject to removal by the
crown upon address of the Parliament. Only one English judge has been removed under that
procedure; that was in 1830. S. SHETREEr, JUDGES ON TRIA (1976), reviewed by Stiegler,
English Judges and Justice, 60 JUDICATURE 298 (1977).
I78 See, e.g., Wallace, The Nunn Bill: An Unneeded Compromise of Judicial
Independence, 61 JUDICATURE 476, 479 n.5 (1978), wherein the author states:
One of my brother judges recently related this graphic illustration of the im-
portance of an independent federal bench: "We had a classic case of this precise
type of threat in two different courts in our . . . community. Both courts were
confronted with a problem of desegregation of local schools; both courts handed
down decisions compelling desegregation. The federal judge is still in office and
doing his work objectively and conscientiously; the state court judge was voted out
of office . . . after his desegregation decision and the sole issue in the campaign
was that decision."
Id. (quoting Letter from Hon. Laughlin E. Waters to Hon. William J. Jameson (Jan. 6,1978)).
17 See notes 190-91 and accompanying text infra.
,' See generally Volcansek-Clark, Why Lawyers Become Judges, 62 JUDICATURE 166
(1978).
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Unfortunately, past experience has shown that retention elec-
tion does not serve its intended function, and will not unless it is
combined with some means of stimulating voter interest and a
mechanism to assure that the public is given the necessary informa-
tion to cast informed votes in the election. ' There is no easy solu-
tion to this facet of the problem. For example, in 1976, the Alaska
Judicial Council conducted a detailed poll of attorneys, peace offi-
cers and jurors regarding nine trial judges up for retention election
that year. Eight of the nine judges were recommended for retention.
One was not recommended for such retention, largely on the basis
of criticism that he did not conduct himself impartially. In the
election, the latter judge outpolled the other eight; all were retained
by the voters.8 2
The Alaska episode raises obvious and disturbing questions
about whether and how the public can actually be educated regard-
ing judges. One possible explanation is that the public and the
media simply place little stock in the conclusions of the organized
bar.' 83 Perhaps a more official screening process will generate more
media interest and public acceptability for its review of the judge's
performance. Some critics of bar polls, for example, have proposed
replacing them with officially sponsored courtroom monitoring and
screening studies, with detailed public reports of their findings.'"
Whichever form of evaluation review is proposed, however, it is
reasonable to conclude that, unless news media support can be at-
tracted for its findings, there is little likelihood that the public will
pay much attention to such polls or performance evaluation re-
ports.'
Another retention/review proposal was suggested by the 1970-
1973 Dominick Commission. The commission placed heavy reliance
on the evaluation and discipline of sitting judges as the principal
means of improving the quality of the bench. While it declined to
recommend a switch to merit appointment, the commission recom-
mended the adoption of a merit procedure for retention of judges.
181 See Jenkins, Retention Elections: Who Wins When No One Loses, 61 JUDICATURE 79,
80-82 (1977).
" Rubinstein, Alaska's Judicial Evaluation Program: A Poll the Voters Rejected, 60
JUDICATURE 478, 483-84 (1977). See also Jenkins, supra note 181, at 80-82. See generally
Anonymous Smears, 61 JUDICATURE 100 (1977) (Letter of M. Miller).
" See Jenkins, supra note 181, at 85-86.
"4 Cf. Anonymous Smears, 61 JUDICATURE 100 (1977) (Letter of M. Miller) (state Judicial
Council poll on judicial candidates should be replaced by official monitoring).
28 See Sheldon, Searching for Judges in Oregon: Where Would the Bar Look for Help?,
61 JUDICATURE 376, 381 (1978). See also Hentel, Where Has Greatness Gone?, 46 N.Y. ST. B.J.
243, 247-48 (1974).
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Under the proposal, the governor (or, in New York City, the mayor)
would be authorized to reappoint a judge whose term has expired.'8 6
In this manner, the Dominick Commission hoped to assure that
judges who have demonstrated high ability on the bench will remain
on the bench and will be spared having to stand for reelection.,',
A possible variant of the Dominick Commission proposal would
have the applicable executive authority review the performance of
the judges in his or her county or other district within a year or two
of their becoming judges, with the power to remove unfit judges.
This same retention/review power could be reposed, alternatively,
with the Commission on Judicial Conduct, the local screening or
nominating commission, or with a series of separate, newly created
judicial Retention Review Commissions. 8'
These executive or committee review proposals represent the
converse of the American Judicature Society's "merit plan." In-
stead of first appointing the judge and then holding an election to
decide if he will remain on the bench, these proposals would elect
the judge first and then use a merit system to determine whether
he or she should be retained. Indeed, the Dominick Commission
proposal itself might fairly be termed "merit reappointment."
The Dominick Commission proposal and its possible variants
have their own drawbacks and inadequacies. First, in the case of the
Dominick Commission proposal, to wait until the end of a judge's
term of office may be too long; supreme court justices, for example,
are elected for 14 years. The commission and its variant proposals
for executive retention review might also place extraordinary power
in the executive.' 9 The implications of this executive power can be
'" Under N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 21(a), the executive already has the power to fill vacancies
on the supreme court by appointment.
I" Dominick Commission Report, note 103 supra, reported in Klein & Witztum, supra
note 103, at 719. The Dominick Commission, however, recommended that the current system
of initial election of supreme court justices be continued. Id. at 53, reported in Klein &
Witztum, supra note 103, at 718.
Ws Following the lead of California and Colorado, several states have recently adopted
judicial review of judicial qualifications commissions. See Schulert & Hoelzel, Court Reform:
The Unheralded Winner of the 1976 Elections, 60 JuicATUm 281 (1977).
UI The belief that the executive is also subject to political bias is the principal argument
raised against the merit plan by election advocates. Some commentators insist that politics
either cannot or should not be removed from the matter of judicial selection. See, e.g.,
Golumb, Selection of the Judiciary: For Election, 24 N.Y. CoUNTY B. BULL. 215, 217-18 (1967);
Harding, The Case For Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A.J. 1162, 1164 (1969); Wormuth
& Rich, Politics, the Bar and the Selection of Judges, 3 UTAH L. REv. 459, 461 (1953). An
appropriate answer for this argument was provided by the Associate Director of the Bar
Institute and Law Center of New Jersey:
The issue, therefore, is not whether judicial selection can be removed from
politics. Because courts form an important link in the network of governmental
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particularly extreme if there is no screening mechanism attached to
the executive's decision, if its findings are not made public, or if
there is no means to appeal or challenge the executive's decision.
This facet of the problem may, however, be alleviated by simply
allowing a rejected judge to stand for election or reelection in the
general election. Finally, these proposals implicitly assume that
there is something negative about judges standing for reelection;
they are therefore likely to face severe opposition from the pro-
election advocates for the same reasons that these advocates oppose
appointment in the first instance.
It is also important to note that there exists an entirely different
view to the retention review question. The federal system, for exam-
ple, is based upon the concept of life tenure, on the theory that that
is essential to preserve the independence of the courts and protect
judges from political or emotional reaction to their decisions. 9 ' This
insistence on independence has its roots in the colonial experience
of the 1600's and 1700's, leading the framers of the Constitution to
give particular attention to the problem of judicial independence in
the 1780's.111 Yet this aspect of the federal judiciary has never been
free of controversy. Particularly in recent years, several leading stu-
dents of the federal judiciary have criticized not only the inability
to remove or censure jurists,9 2 but also the philosophical basis of the
power, their chief officers do fulfill a political role. Rather, the issue is how the
public's interest in obtaining the most competent, disinterested, and independent
judges can be best protected.
Seiler, Judicial Selection in New Jersey, 5 SnroN HALL L. Rav. 721, 725 (1974).
,,0 See, e.g., Berkson & Tesitor, Holding Federal Judges Accountable, 61 JUDICATURE 442
(1978). "The Framers of the Constitution recognized the compelling need to isolate judges
from the political process. Indeed, they believed judicial independence to be one of the corner-
stones of American democracy." Id. at 443; accord, Wallace, The Nunn Bill: An Unneeded
Compromise of Judicial Independence, 61 JUDICATURE 476, 479 (1978). Given the power that
United States Senators have had in the past to veto federal judicial nominations for their
states, whether this belief translated into reality is subject to question. This power now
appears to be coming to an end under Senator Kennedy's chairmanship of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee. See Kennedy to End Veto of Judges by Home-State Senators, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 26, 1979, at A-9, cols. 5-6.
"' Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. Rav. 1104,
1116-18, 1153-56 (1976). See generally THE FEDERALIsT, Nos. 78 & 79 (Cooke 1961); Berkson
& Tesitor, supra note 190, at 443; Cutler & Cutler, Should We Rush to Judgment on the Nunn
Bill?, 61 JUDICATURE 459, 460 (1978); Rosenbaum & Lee, A Constitutional Perspective on
Judicial Tenure, 61 JUDICATUftE 465 (1978).
"' See Andrews, Judicial Removal of Federal Judges: A Statutory Alternative to
Impeachment, 11 GA. ST. B.J. 157 (1975); Boyd, Federal Judges: To Whom Must They
Answer?, 61 A.B.A.J. 324 (1975); Byrd, Has Life Tenure Outlived Its Time?, 59 JUDICATURE
266 (1976); Lumbard, The Nunn Bill: A Way to Ensure Judicial Accountability, 61
JUDICATURE 477 (1978); Editorial, On the Discipline and Removal of Federal Judges, 61
JUDICATURE 440 (1978).
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life tenure system itself.93 These critics argue that public accounta-
bility of judges is preferable to complete judicial independence or
that, as a minimum, a system that accomodates both of these aims
is desirable. 9 Legislation, endorsed in principal by the American
Judicature Society, has been introduced and supported by promi-
nent members of the Senate to provide an easier vehicle than im-
peachment to discipline federal judges who are found guilty of var-
ious forms and degrees of misconduct. 9 5 That legislation is far less
broad than the retention review proposals discussed above, but the
fact that it is proposed and has gained backing among judges, legis-
lators and scholars of the judicial system indicates an increasing
sense of public frustration over the inability to maintain review over
those who man the courts.
Several forms of retention review have been proposed. None is
a complete answer to the problem, and each has its own drawbacks
and failings. Indeed, retention election has been severely criticized
as ineffectual and merely a rubber-stamp procedure. 96 For example,
of the more than 350 trial and appellate judges up for retention
election in thirteen states in 1976, only three lost.'97 These findings
undeniably indicate that retention election is not an effective means
'1 See Turley, Judicial Selection and Tenure, 25 TENN. L. REv. 352,352-57 (1957); Letter
to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1979, at A-16, cols. 4-6 (letter of Raoul Berger).
" Discussing the desirability of various methods of accountability, Senior Judge Edward
Lumbard of the United States Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit recently wrote that
"independence to decide cases and make judicial rulings is one thing; independence to behave
any way the judge pleases, without consideration for what is proper, is another." Lumbard,
supra note 192, at 482-83. See also Kaufman, Keeping the Judiciary Independent, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 16, 1979, at A-15, cols. 2-6.
Others argue that to create a federal judicial disciplinary commission which can censure
judges without impeaching and necessarily removing them will help insure judicial quality
without impairing judicial independence. See Fox, An Alternative to Impeaching U.S.
Judges, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 1978, at 1, col. 1:
A classic example raised involved the allegations against former Justice Wil-
liam 0. Douglas of the Supreme Court who was accused of questionable judicial
conduct concerning off-the-bench writings. Efforts-obviously politically in-
spired-to impeach him failed, but the justice nevertheless found himself for some
time under a cloud of suspicion. Were there an independent agency for evaluating
complaints, Nunn bill advocates argue that the entire episode would have been
readily concluded.
Id. at 32, col. 2.
"I This is the so-called "Nunn Bill" or "Judicial Tenure Act," S. 1423, 95th Cong., 2d
Ses. (1978). The bill passed the Senate on Sept. 7, 1978, but has been blocked in the
House of Representatives. See N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
IN See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 181, at 80.
" Id. at 82. The Jenkins Study concluded that "[tihere . .. seem[s] to be some
validity to the charge that a judge must commit a crime or a flagrant moral offense to be
removed from office in a merit retention vote." Id. at 85.
19791
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of evaluating sitting judges. ' There are, however, other possible
types of retention review, and it appears proper to conclude that,
like nonpartisan election proposals, retention review proposals may
have merit when combined with other compromise reforms. They
thus warrant further review and consideration.
H. Confirmation of Judges
Borrowing from the federal system, some reformers suggest that
judicial appointees and even judges-elect be required to be con-
firmed after selection, by the state senate or by a judicial qualifica-
tions committee. Such a system has been adopted for appointees in
a number of other states and has been backed by former Chief Judge
Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals.'99 As yet, it has not been
adopted for electees.
Giving the legislature or a special committee a veto power over
appointees is easier to understand than giving them one over elected
judges. Where the local voters have spoken on their preferences, it
is difficult to see why statewide representatives should be able to
override those choices.2 0 Confirmation, however, might still be fea-
sible if adopted on a limited basis, e.g., only for elected or appointed
judges, or for specified courts. As has often occurred in the case of
federal judges, the confirmation process could reveal important
facts about potential judges and check against unfit designations by
local party leaders."' Most of the work burden would be absorbed
,g One commentator has stated:
The emphasis of the Missouri Plan, however, is not on removing poor judges,
but on keeping them off the bench in the first place. Dean Roscoe Pound in discuss-
ing this problem said, "[t]oo much thought has been given to the matter of getting
less qualified judges off the bench. The real remedy is not to put them on."
Comment, Judicial Selection and Tenure-A Merit Plan for Arizona? 9 Amz. L. REv. 297,
303 (1967)(quoting R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO HAYNES, SELECTION & TENURE OF JUDGES Xiv
(1944)).
"I This plan is known as "the California Plan." See A Need For Change, supra note 6,
at 607. But see Wilson Opposes Appointment of Judges as a 'Papa'Scheme, N.Y. Times, Mar.
14, 1974, at 74, col. 6. See generally Goldstein, Judicial Groups Split on Reform, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 3, 1974, at 30, col. 1.
"* The legislature appears receptive to having confirmation responsibility, as indicated
by its inclusion in the legislation leading to the constitutional amendment adopted in 1977
to create merit selection for court of appeals judgeships. Fitzhugh, 'First Step' In State Court
Reform Hailed, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
" The federal process, however, has rejected very few appointees. When rejections occur,
they generally take place in the more publicized appointments, such as those for the Supreme
Court. Two particularly significant instances occurred during the Nixon years when two
United States Court of Appeals judges whom the President nominated to the Supreme Court
were rejected by the Senate. The recent movement for expanding the ability of Congress to
censure and remove federal judges may indicate that a substantial body of knowledgeable
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by the Judiciary Committee, so that legislative disruption might not
be as serious as the number of judicial posts might indicate. More-
over, if combined with other corollary reforms, confirmation and
postselection review could be reduced to manageable proportions.
Nevertheless, confirmation dppears to pose serious potential politi-
cal problems, particularly if required for elected judges. Such a
reform would also undoubtedly require a constitutional amendment
and, thus, is less attractive as a compromise reform than several
others proposed and discussed here. But it is worthy of further ex-
ploration if other compromises do not garner a sufficient following.
I. Attracting Better Judges: Salary and Staffing
The quality of judges can also be improved by attracting better
candidates in the first place. Two uncomplicated steps which have
been suggested to achieve that aim are to raise the salaries of
judges 0 1 and to improve the judges' support staffs and court facili-
ties."3 To some observers, the cry of monetary hardship is unbecom-
ing and ill-deserved. They point out that the salaries of New York
justices and judges, according to a 1978 Study by the National
Center for State Courts, are the second highest in the country.24
These critics, however, improperly ignore the realities involved.
Successful and able lawyers can and do earn much more than the
salaries currently given our judges.20 5 The inability of judges to have
persons do not believe that the confirmation process is sufficient to insure the high quality
of the federal bench. See notes 192-195 and accompanying text supra.
262 Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 521; Finkelstein, Salary Increases for Local Judges,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 3. The problem of salary is not unique to New York or the
other state court systems. Senator Charles Percy of Illinois thus wrote:
Attracting first-rate attorneys to federal judicial service at current salary levels is
a serious problem. During the past seven years, many individuals who were among
my first choices as judicial candidates decided that they could not accept such
positions because of salary considerations.
Percy, No Royal Road to Justice, 60 JuDicATUR 184, 185 (1976).
n See, e.g., Walsh, Two Basic Steps Toward the Better Selection of Federal Judges, 12
AMR. U. L. Rv. 14 (1963); Judges Tell Panels in Albany of Need for Salary Raises, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
2" Survey of Judicial Salaries in States'3 Highest Courts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 2,
col. 3. Court of Appeals judges are paid $60,575, appellate division justices $51,627 and
supreme court justices $48,998 per year. Only the federal system and California exceed these
levels. In Texas, for example, the figures were $49,800, $43,900 and $34,500, respectively. In
Rhode Island, they were $36,300 for appellate judges and $34,100 for trial level judges. Id.
The newly impaneled State Commission on Legislative and Judicial Salaries recently
recommended to Governor Carey that New York state judges receive a 25% salary increase
and that travel expenses be reimbursed when the judges sit in counties other than that of
their residence. Panel Proposes State Increase Judges' Salaries, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 27, 1978, at
1, col. 4. This would make New York judges the highest paid state judges in the nation.
" Utter, Selection and Retention-A Judge's Perspective, 48 WASH. L. Rav. 839, 843-44
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outside earnings must also be kept in mind, since supplementing
their income raises ethical questions. 2°8 Inflation must also be con-
sidered. New York last raised judicial salaries in 1974.27 Every other
state except Mississippi has granted raises to judges since then, and
several other states have adopted automatic cost-of-living raises for
their judicial officers. 2 s A substantial raise of judicial compensa-
tion, therefore, appears to be the minimum next step we should take
in the area of judicial reform.
Another important inducement to better qualified lawyers to
seek judgeships is to give them an assurance of support when they
are on the bench. Successful lawyers have such support staffs and
facilities in private practice and are loathe to give them up, espe-
cially with the heavy workloads they would face on the bench.
Judges must be assured that they will have the backup support to
function effectively. Adequate support staffs will free the judges to
give more attention to the more complex aspects of their judicial
duties.
(1973); Walsh, supra note 203, at 16. Judge Stanley Gartenstein, President of the City Family
Court Judges Association, gave the following testimony at a joint meeting of the New York
State Assembly:
I don't think anyone in this room can really believe that judges are being paid
anywhere near what they can earn on the outside, or that the salaries we receive
are anywhere commensurate with the responsibilities we bear ....
I can tell you that as of this moment, we are simply not making it financially
(on a salary of $42,251). We need not remind you that added sources of income are
just about nill-that ethical considerations prevent us from taking on supplemental
gainful employment ....
We have climbed to the very top of this profession only to find that it is
economically impossible to stay here. It has been said that only the very rich can
afford to run for executive or legislative office. The day is coming when this may
be true of the judiciary as well. If and when that comes, we will have only ourselves
to blame.
Judges Tell Panels in Albany of Need of Salary Raises, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 3,
at 4, col. 4.
2" Id.
- Survey of Judicial Salaries in States' 3 Highest Courts, supra note 204. The New York
Constitution merely provides that judicial compensation "shall be established by law and
shall not be diminished during the term of office for which [the judge] was elected or
appointed. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 25(a). Thus, judicial salaries are a matter for legislative
action, and do not require a constitutional amendment. [Editor's Note: As this article goes
to press, the New York legislature has voted a further salary increase of 3.5% for all judges,
Dionne, Pay Increases Voted for Legislators and Judges, N.Y. Times, April 4, 1979, at A-i,
cols. 3-5, only partially accepting the. recommendation of an ad hoc committee appointed by
Governor Carey to study the situation. See Hochberger, 18% Salary Raise Proposed For 1040
Judges in State, N.Y.L.J., March 19, 1979, at 1, col. 2].
m New York and Mississippi are the states with the longest pending salary rates; neither
state has adjusted judicial salaries since 1974. The last increase in the federal system was in
March 1977 when salaries were raised to $54,500 for trial judges, $57,500 for intermediate
appellate judges, and $72,000 for Supreme Court Justices. See Survey of Judicial Salaries in
States' 3 Highest Courts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
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J. Specialization and Judicial Education
One of the most intriguing judicial reform proposals is to seek
to take advantage of the increasing specialization of practicing law-
yers by instituting specialization in the courts.219 Such proposals
have generally focused on the federal courts, .but the same logic
applies with equal force to the state courts.
21 1
Chief Judge Irving Kaufman of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has explained the rationale for speciali-
zation as follows:
A judge's expertise and familiarity with today's increasingly com-
plex legal system cannot be achieved solely through improvements
in selection and training. Even the most talented and best edu-
cated scientist is not expected to be equally adept in nuclear phys-
ics, neurosurgery and engineering. But judges pride themselves on
being generalists able to master quickly any area of law involved
in the case before them. Nevertheless even the most blithely self-
assured judge will occasionally admit to uneasiness when con-
fronted with a case involving the most arcane and technical areas
of the law.2 1'
These considerations do not mean that all courts and judges
could be specialized; rather, they suggest that some be.212 For exam-
2" The potential gains from specialization were aptly summarized by a prominent lay
commentator:
Presumably this would result in trials being administered more confidently, with
less time spent in unimportant tangents, and with decisions that are more informed
and therefore of greater future usefulness. They also would be more secure against
appeal, saving future time in the courts.
Shapiro, Query: Can We Match the Skills of Our Judges to the Needs of Our Courts?, 62
JUDICATURE 164, 164-65 (1978). See also Handberg, Should We Try Special Courts for Special
Kinds of Disputes, 62 JumcATURE 318 (1979).
21, See, e.g., Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the Next Century, 32 REC. OF N.Y.C.B.A. 9,
25-26 (1977). Compare Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Fede-
ral Appellate System, 59 Commu L. REv. 597 (1974) (favoring criminal and civil specializa-
tion) with Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNEaL L. Rav. 634, 638-
39 (1974) (against criminal versus civil specialization).
"I Kaufman, supra note 210, at 25-26; see, e.g., Nejelski, Query: Do Minor Disputes
Deserve Second Class Justice?, 61 JUDICATURE 102, 103 (1977) wherein the author states:
We need simplification of courts and procedures, but should not automatically
insist on unthinking unification. There are differences between big and small cases,
and they should be treated accordingly. And judges should be carefully selected as
individuals for the different courts or specialized divisions. The judge who is appro-
priate to hear complex litigation may be inappropriate for small claims and
vice versa.
212 Most reformers, however, advocate unification of the courts rather than proliferation.
McCloy, In Favor of Amendments to Reform Courts, N.Y.L.J, Oct. 19, 1977, at 1, col. 1. Both
Governor Hugh Carey and former Chief Judge Charles Breitel have supported and joined the
pro-unification forces, arguing that regionalism would add to local court backlogs and forum-
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ple, tax, real estate, zoning condemnation and matrimonial matters
can readily be segregated from other matters and handled by spe-
cialized parts and judges.
It should be noted that some specialization already exists in the
supreme courts and in the lower courts. For example, many supreme
courts have a matrimonial part, and New York City has a separate
civil and criminal court. 13 At present, supreme court justices gener-
ally rotate among specialized parts in that court. It would be a
modest step to provide for permanent specialized parts for those
matters and to select specialized judges to sit in those parts perma-
nently. The same would be done for new specialized areas which
might be designated.
The principal potential drawback of such specialization would
be the creation of legal fiefdoms for some of the specialized judges.
This problem, however, may be controlled by careful appellate re-
view, provided that excess deference is not accorded to the special-
ists by the appellate courts. "' If that problem does appear to become
a reality, it may be necessary to create separate specialized appel-
late courts with their own specialized judges to deal with it. Another
potential difficulty could be a shortage of specialized judges or staff
aides for the specialized parts. But it may be possible to resolve that
shopping. Address by Governor Hugh L. Carey, New York County Lawyer Association An-
nual Dinner (Dec. 8, 1977), reprinted in VEssEY STREET LETrER, at 3, col. 1 (N.Y. County Law.
Ass'n, Jan. 1978); Breitel, The New Judicial Amendment, VESSEY STRErT LrrER, at 3, col. 1
(N.Y. County Law. Ass'n, Nov. 1976).
123 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 15; N.Y. Crry CIVIL CT. AcT (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1978-
1979); N.Y. Crry CmRmAL CT. AcT (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1978-1979). Section 15(a) of
Article 6 of the New York Constitution provides for the selection of judges for these courts as
follows:
The judges of the court of city-wide civil jurisdiction shall be residents of such city
and shall be chosen for terms of ten years by the lectors of the counties included
within the city of New York from districts within such counties established by law.
The judges of the court of city-wide criminal jurisdiction shall be residents of such
city and shall be appointed for terms of ten years by the mayor of the city of New
York.
N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 15(a).
21 In administrative review proceedings, the courts have held that "a determination by
an administrative agency is presumed to be correct" and that, in view of the agency's general
expertise in the area, the reviewing body will not set aside the agency's determinations
"unless it clearly appears to be arbitrary or contrary to law." City of Syracuse v. Hueber, 52
App. Div. 2d 341, 344, 383 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (4th Dep't 1976); see Lezette v. Board of Educ.,
35 N.Y.2d 272, 281, 319 N.E.2d 189, 194, 360 N.Y.S.2d 869, 976 (1974); Fiore v. Zoning Bd.
of Appeals, 21 N.Y.2d 393, 396, 235 N.E.2d 121, 123, 288 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64 (1968); People ex
rel. Hudson-Harlem Valley Title & Mortgage Co. v. Walker, 282 N.Y. 400, 405, 26 N.E.2d
952, 954 (1940). Such a test would appear to be too narrow for specialized courts. The
appellate court should review both the facts and the law and give deference to a specialized
trial part only on matters directly related to and squarely within its expertise.
JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM
problem by having one specialized part per district or for large parts
of each judicial district or by having specialized judges, in effect,
"ride circuit." '215
Additionally, efforts can and should be made to increase and
improve continuing judicial education.2"6 Seminars and other judi-
cial education programs have been established and administered by
such organizations as the Institute of Judicial Administration, the
Federal Judicial Center, the National College of Trial Judges, the
National College of the State Judiciary and the American Academy
of Judicial Education. 21 More and more of these programs are being
proposed and adopted each year. They vary from orientation courses
for new judges to "refresher" courses and specialized training in
complex and technical areas of the law. At least three states have
already made refresher courses mandatory for judges and several
others have required lower court judges to attend an annual confer-
ence where continuing judicial education is provided. 21 1
The principal benefits of judicial education programs were
summarized by the former director of the Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration as follows:
The value of these various programs of judicial education is ob-
vious: they improve the quality of the judiciary by increasing the
technical proficiency of the judges. Hardly less important is the
strengthening of their morale and esprit de corps by putting them
into contact with other judges whom they might not otherwise
215 Shapiro, Can We Match Skills of Our Judges to the Needs of Our Courts?, 62
JUDICATURE 164, 164-65 (1978). One federal judge has suggested a procedure whereby, in
complex technological cases, the courts could require the litigants to provide specialized help
of whatever nature the judge feels necessary. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and
the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974).
211 See PREsIDENT's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 68-69 (1967); D. KAR AN, JUDICIL ADMINISTRATION: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 48-49 (1970); Gutman, An Experiment in Judicial Educations, 52
JUDICATURE 366 (1969); Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 523-24; Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the
Next Century, 32 REC. OF N.Y.C.B.A. 9, 25 (1977); Rosenberg, Judging Goes to College, 52
A.B.A.J. 342 (1966). See generally INSTrrITE OF JUDICLL ADMINISTRATION, A GUIDE TO COURT
SYSTEMS 39-40 (5th ed. 1971).
"I See Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 523-24; Kaufman, supra note 216, at 25; Shetreet, A
Changing Society, a Changing Judiciary on Both Sides of the Atlantic, 60 JUDICATURE 332,
340 (1977). See generally Cady & Coe, Education of Judicial Personnel: Coals to Newcastle?,
7 CONN. L. REv. 423 (1975).
21 Shetreet, supra note 217, at 340-41; see Hansen, The Continuing Education Program
of the Wisconsin Judiciary, 52 MARQ. L. Rxv. 240 (1968). As Chief Judge Kaufman of the
United States court of appeals explained in a bi-centennial address: "Education of judges
should, moreover, be a continuing process. Twenty years ago, the idea of judges going back
to school 'would have seemed ludicrous to most members of the profession,' but considerable
progress in instituting such programs has been made in the interim." Kaufman, supra note
216, at 25.
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know and showing them their problems are not unique or personal,
but common to all judges. There are subsidiary advantages that
are less apparent. One is that they may have some influence upon
the selection of judges. If lawyers know that they are expected to
go back to school if they become judges, men who are lazy or
arrogant or who look upon judicial service as a species of retire-
ment may be dissuaded from seeking judicial office."19
These perceptions have gained wide acceptance, both in the
United States and in England. 0 Given the obvious benefits to be
obtained, compulsory, continuing judicial education programs can
and should be increased and given public support.221
IV. CONCLUSION
The conflict between those who favor merit selection appoint-
ment and those who favor election of judges is likely to continue in
the foreseeable future. Several compromise reforms are available to
improve the quality of the judiciary in the interim. Some of these
compromise proposals have substantial merit and can greatly en-
hance the judiciary while the appointment versus election debate
continues, particularly if they are enacted in conjunction with other
compromise reforms. The need for public confidence in the courts
and the integrity of the judiciary requires that we not forebear any
further from adopting compromise reforms. The fears of some that
to do so will undermine their underlying positions in the appoint-
ment versus election debate are unfounded and, in any event, are
not a sufficient justification for further delaying improvement of our
current judicial selection system.
219 Karlen, Judicial Education, 52 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1054 (1966). Paul Nejelski, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in the Office for Improvement. in the Administration of Justice
in the United States Department of Justice recently suggested that "[e]very 'high' court
judge should, on a regular basis, hear some 'low' court cases. In the federal system, some
judges from the U.S. Court of Appeals might sit on trial from time to time. State supreme
court justices might sit in small claims or family relations court." Nejelski, Do Minor Dis-
putes Deserve Second-Class Justice, 61 JuDicATuRE 102, 103 (1977).
See generally Shetreet, supra note 217, at 339-41.
221 See generally Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 62 A.B.A.J. 443,
444 (1976); Hentel, Where Has Greatness Gone?, 46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 243, 250-51 (1974);
O'Connell, Continuing Legal Education for the Judiciary, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 405 (1964).
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